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Abstract 
Failure, collapse, bankruptcy, and best are common words in the construction 
industry since construction industry involves many risks. 
This research is conducted to determine the causes of construction business failure 
and to investigate the severity of these causes from the contractor's point of view. 
The objectives of this research have been achieved by means of interviewed 
questionnaire. The questionnaire included fifty three questions distributed to 
seventy-five contracting companies. Sixty-five questionnaires from which received 
and analyzed to determine the severity of each factor affecting contractor's failure. 
The gathered data include the sample characteristics of the study population and the 
five main groups; managerial, financed, expansion, environment, and political. 
The results of analyzing 53 causes of failure showed that the main cause of 
contractors failure are: delay in collecting dibs from clients (donors), closure, 
depending on banks and paying high profits, lack of capital, cash flow management, 
lack of experience in the line of Gaza Strip, absence of construction regulations, low 
margins of profit due to competition, award contract to lowest price, and lack of 
experience in contracts. 
The results of this study recommended that PNA must take the risk when Donors 
delay the dibs, modify and improve the construction regulations, connect price with 
index, introduce coherent polices towards groups suffered people injured by failure, 
conduct training programs to explain the external and internal factors affecting the 
construction industry, and award tenders to accurate estimate cost and not necessary 
to the lowest bidder.  The study also recommended the contractors to avoid bank 
loans, react to political and environment changes, not to increase the number of 
projects and not to increase the volume of project, make sure that top management 
must not be of  same knowledge and experience, and to calculate and consider 
political and environmental risks in costing and estimating contracts. 
   
VI  
 ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ
ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ اﻟﻔﺸﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻤﻴﺰ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻹﻧﺸﺎءات ﻟﻤѧﺎ ﻳﻤﻴѧﺰ هѧﺬﻩ اﻟѧﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ ﺑﻮﺟѧﻮد اﻟﻌﺪﻳѧﺪ ﻣѧﻦ 
  .اﻟﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ
إن اﻟﻬﺪف اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻲ ﻣﻦ هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ هﻮ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ أﺳﺒﺎب ﺷﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻻت ﻓѧﻲ ﻗﻄѧﺎع ﻏѧﺰة، وﺗﺤﺪﻳѧﺪ 
  .درﺟﺔ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ آﻞ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻬﺔ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ
ﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺤﻮﺑﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ اﻷهﺪاف، ﺣﻴﺚ ﺗﻢ ﻟﻘﺪ اﺳﺘﺨﺪم هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أﺳﻠﻮب اﻻ 
ﺗﻮزﻳﻊ ﺧﻤﺲ وﺳﺒﻌﻴﻦ اﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺷﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻻت ﻓѧﻲ ﻗﻄѧﺎع ﻏѧﺰة، ﺣﻴѧﺚ ﺗﻤѧﺖ إﻋѧﺎدة ﺧﻤѧﺲ 
  .وﺳﺘﻴﻦ اﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ
وﻗﺪ اﺣﺘﻮت اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ وﺧﻤﺴﻴﻦ ﺳﺒﺒًﺎ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻤﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ وهﻲ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋѧﺔ 
  .ﻴﺔ، اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻴﻌﻴﺔ، اﻟﺒﻴﺌﻴﺔ، واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔاﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻹدارﻳﺔ، اﻟﻤﺎﻟ
اﺳѧﺘﺮداد اﻟﻤﺒѧﺎﻟﻎ ﺑѧﺴﺮﻋﺔ : وﻗﺪ أوﺿﺤﺖ اﻟﻨﺘѧﺎﺋﺞ أن أهѧﻢ اﻷﺳѧﺒﺎب اﻟﺘѧﻲ ﺗѧﺴﺒﺐ ﻓѧﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻟﻴﻦ هѧﻲ 
وﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ، اﻹﻏﻼق، اﻻﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك ودﻓﻊ ﻓﻮاﺋﺪ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﺔ، رأس اﻟﻤﺎل ﻏﻴﺮ آﺎﻓﻲ، إدارة اﻟѧﺴﻴﻮﻟﺔ 
إﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ، ﻏﻴﺎب اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ واﻟﻨﻈﻢ ﻟѧﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ، ﻧﻘﺺ اﻟﺨﺒﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﻌﻤﻞ، ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع 
اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻻت، ﻗﻠѧﺔ اﻷرﺑѧﺎح ﺑѧﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓѧﺴﺔ، ﺗﺮﺳѧﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻄѧﺎءات ﻋﻠѧﻲ أﻗѧﻞ اﻷﺳѧﻌﺎر، ﻗﻠѧﺔ اﻟﺨﺒѧﺮة ﻓѧﻲ 
  .ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﻌﻘﻮد
وﻗﺪ أوﺻﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ ﺑﺄن ﺗﺘﺤﻤﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻨѧﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺘѧﺄﺧﺮ اﻟѧﺪول اﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤѧﺔ ﻓѧﻲ دﻓѧﻊ 
اﻟﻨﻈﻢ واﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﻜѧﻢ ﺻѧﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻻت ﺑﻤѧﺎ ﻳѧﻀﻤﻦ ﻣﺴﺘﺤﻘﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ، وأن ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺘﻌﺪﻳﻞ 
ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻲ ﻟﻺﻏﻼق، وآﺬﻟﻚ رﺑﻂ اﻷﺳﻌﺎر ﺑﺠﺪول ﻏﻼء اﻟﻤﻌﻴѧﺸﺔ، آﻤѧﺎ أوﺻѧﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳѧﺔ 
اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺔ ﺑﻌﻤﻞ دورات ﺗﺪرﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻣﻊ اﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ واﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻹﺳѧﻼﻣﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﻄѧﻮﻳﺮ 
ﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳѧﺴﺎﻋﺪ اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﺘﻌѧﺮف ﻋﻠѧﻰ اﻟﻌﻮاﻣѧﻞ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴѧﺔ اﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ اﻹدارﻳﺔ واﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻘ 
اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻻت، إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻋﺪم ﺗﺮﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻄﺎءات ﻋﻠﻰ أﻗﻞ اﻷﺳﻌﺎر وﺗﺮﺳѧﻴﺘﻬﺎ 
  .  ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻌﺮ اﻷﻧﺴﺐ
آﻤѧѧﺎ أوﺻѧѧﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳѧѧﺔ اﻟﻤﻘѧѧﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﺑﺘﺠﻨѧѧﺐ ﻗѧѧﺮوض اﻟﺒﻨѧѧﻮك، آﻤѧѧﺎ أوﺻѧѧﺖ إدارة اﻟѧѧﺸﺮآﺎت ﺑﻮﺿѧѧﻊ 
 ﺗﺘﻮاﻓﻖ ﻣѧﻊ اﻟﻤﺘﻐﻴѧﺮات اﻟѧﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻟﺒﻴﺌﻴѧﺔ، وأوﺻѧﺖ اﻟﻤﻘѧﺎوﻟﻴﻦ آѧﺬﻟﻚ ﺑﻌѧﺪم ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺎت إدارﻳﺔ وﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ 
  .زﻳﺎدة ﻋﺪد وﺣﺠﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة اﻹدارﻳﺔ واﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ
 آﻤﺎ أوﺻﺖ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﺑﺄن ﺗﻜﻮن إدارﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ واﻟﺨﺒﺮة، وأوﺻﺖ آﺬﻟﻚ 
  .اﻟﺒﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻄﺎءاتﺑﺤﺴﺎب واﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻷﺧﻄﺎر اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ و
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This research is to try to define what is that causes perfectly healthy companies to 
collapse or fail. Understanding this mechanism can perhaps prevent their failure or 
alleviating it or may be even reversing it. 
In this chapter an introduction to the construction industry and the Palestinian economy 
will be highlighted. Also, the research importance, problem, objectives, and boundaries 
are to be explained. 
1.1 Background 
 
Collapsed, failed, bankrupt, broke, and bust. None of these are pleasant words, and this 
is not a very pleasant subject, but in real life companies do collapse, they do fail, do 'go 
bust' (Argenti, 1976).   
 The prospect of construction business failure is an important topic to explore. Since 
construction industry has a very high risks, failure is a real possibility. In the overall 
picture the construction industry is at or near the top in the annual rate of business 
failures and resulting liabilities (Clough, 1994). The construction business failures 
become very high due to the characteristics of the construction industry. The 
construction industry is fragmented, very sensitive to economic cycles, and highly 
competitive because of the large number of firms and relative easy of entry (Kangari, 
1988). Also, the adversely relationship between the three parties of project (owner, 
consultant, and contractor) is one of the important factor that increase the possibility of 
failure. The contractor is at for more risk than his counterpart in almost any other 
industry (Kangari, 1987). In general, the study of construction business failure has not 
been given much attention. This is particularly true in Gaza strip. The increasing 
number of failures in construction firms makes the understanding of such subject vital 
(critical). This research will be focused to explore the factors that lead to contractor's 
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failure and identify the severity of each factor. This could help to prevent or reverse a 
firm's collapse.  
1.2 The Construction Industry 
  
The construction industry was the largest business segment in the U.S. economy, 
representing about 10 percent of gross national product (GNP) (Ritz, 1994). 
Construction industry includes all immobile structures, such as buildings, tunnels, 
pipelines, dams, canals, airports, power plants, railroads, docks, bridges, sewage 
treatment plants, and factories (Hinze, 2001). Construction is becoming increasingly 
challenging with modern-day clients intricate requirements for complex construction, 
high quality products and shorter completion times (Otowda, 1989). 
1.3 The nature of the construction industry 
 
The nature of the construction projects makes the industry unique in that the 
manufacturing facility or plant must move to the construction site (Hinze, 2001). There 
are many different descriptions of the construction industry, drawn from different 
specialist disciplines. This vagueness is compounded by the fact that the construction 
involves such a wide range of activity that the industry's external boundaries are also 
unclear (Murdoch and Hughes, 2000). For example, the term "construction" can include 
the erection, repair, and demolition of things and diverse as houses, offices, shapes, 
dams …etc. Construction is difficult to comprehend fully because the relationships 
between the parts are not always clear and the boundaries of the industry may be 
characterized as: 
• It is fragmented 
• It is sensitive to economic cycles 
• There are extraordinary diversity of professions, specialists and suppliers 
• It is largely affected by external environments 
There is no other industry that requires the proper application of business practices 
much as construction industry. The many variables and complex relationships that exist 
between variables that must be considered in the process of building a construction 
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project necessitates sound business practices and decisions. The coordination and use of 
many types of labor skills, materials and equipment that are used to build a project 
require daily application of proper business practices (Adrian, 1975). The variable 
environment surrounding the construction project complicated decisions to be made 
concerning the use of labor, materials and equipment. In addition, governmental 
influence and labor practices have a bearing on business decisions that must be made 
(Adrian, 1975). 
1.4 Management in Construction 
 
On the whole, construction contractors have been slow in applying proper management 
methods to the conduct of their business (Clough and Sears, 1994). Management in 
construction industry have been characterized as being weak, insufficient, nebulous, 
backward and slow to react to changing conditions. Nevertheless, in the overall picture 
the construction industry is at or near the top in the annual rate of business failures and 
resulting liabilities (Clough and Sears, 1994). Explanations are given for why the 
construction has been slow in applying management procedures that have proven 
effective in other industries. The reasons are: 
• Construction projects are unique 
• Construction projects involve many skills largely non-repetitive in nature 
• Projects are constructed under local conditions of weather, location, 
transportation and labor that are more or less beyond the contractor's control. 
• Construction firms, in main, are small operations, with the management 
decisions being made by one or two persons (Clough and Sears, 1994) 
• There are special problems in construction 
• The future can not be forecasted 
• Construction is a high-risk business (Raftery, 1997) 
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1.5 Risks in Construction 
 
The construction industry generally has a bad reputation for its work. The industry has a 
reputation for time and cost overruns (Raftery, 1997). This bad reputation is due to 
many reasons. One of them is that the construction industry is one of riskiest of all 
business types (Clough and Sears, 1994). There are many types of risk in the 
construction contracts; they are: 
• Physical works 
• Delay and disputes 
• Direction and supervision 
• Damage and injury to persons and property 
• External factors 
• Payment 
• Law and arbitration 
1.6 The Size of the Construction Industry 
 
The construction industry represents the largest single activity in the American 
economy. It accounts for over $80 billion in expenditures per year in new construction 
alone and constitutes 7 to 11 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Hinze, 
2001). Approximately 5 to 6 million workers of the industrial workforce in U.S.A. are 
employed directly in the construction industry. These numbers do not include nearly 
1,300,000 establishments with no payroll or the more than 1 million non-construction 
employees required to keep the industry viable. Furthermore, 15 percent of the 
industrial workforce is directly or indirectly involve in the construction (Hinze, 2001). 
1.7 The Construction Economy 
 
The construction industry is large in size and significant in the role it plays in the 
economy (Hinze, 2001). Construction industry fortunes tend to fluctuate with the 
general economy (Olomolaiye, Jayawardane and Charrie, 1998). Construction has a 
cyclical nature and quick response to changes in the economy. For that reason, entry in 
the industry must be facilitated. In fact, more than one in every eight business starts 
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occurs in construction (Hinze, 2001). The easy entry is made possible and necessary for 
the following reasons: 
• High growth rate in the construction industry 
• Low capital requirements 
• Little absolute cost or profit advantages for established firms 
• No rigid licensing requirements or fees 
• Firms are seldom sold as a unit (continuity is not assured or guaranteed) 
• A company can be formed just to construct a single project (Hinze, 2001). 
1.8 Construction Categories 
 
There are four categories in the USA. They are housing construction, non-residual 
building construction, engineering construction and industrial construction. In Gaza 
Strip and The West Bank, there are five broad categories. These categories are listed 
below: 
• Building construction 
• Roads 
• Water and drainage 
• Electromechanical 
• Maintenance and general works. (PCU, 1994) 
The distribution of Gaza Strip contractors among the major three fields of work in the 
construction industry is illustrated in Table 1.1. In Roads field 14.2% of the roads 
companies are classified in first class (A&B). 22% are registered in first class in water 
and sewage fields. Out of 132 companies of valid registration in 2001, 34%, 9.8%, and 
11.36 are classified in the class in the fields of buildings, roads, water sewage 
respectively (Sawalhi, 2002).  
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Table 1.1 Distribution of contracting companies among different fields of construction 
works (Contractors Union, 2001) 
First Field 
A B 
Second Third Fourth Fifth Total 
Buildings 19 26 41 13 7 15 121 
Roads 6 7 13 26 16 23 91 
Water and 
Drainage 
15 18 11 18 6 68 
   
1.9 The Contractor's Organization 
 
The Palestinian Contractors' Union (PCU) was established in 1994. It performs a 
number of valuable services for its members such as classification procedures, follow-
up and solving problems, increase industry cultures and habits, support inter-social 
relationships between members …etc. 
1.10 Failures in Construction 
 
Throughout recent years the construction industry has witnessed an increasing number 
of construction financial failures (Adrian, 1997). The construction contracting business 
has the second highest failure rate of any business, exceeded only by restaurants 
(Clough and Sears, 2000). Although many of the firms that fail are small in regard to 
their owned assets, there is evidence of business failures among large firms (Adrian, 
1997). For the past several years, construction contractors have accounted for a 
disproportionate number of business failures in the U.S.A. For example, during 1994 in 
which construction accounted for 8 percent of the gross national product, contractors 
accounted for approximately 22 percent of all financial failures and 18 percent of the 
resulting liabilities. Business failures in the construction industry can be traced by many 
causes. Some of these are related to excessive competition, unexpected bad weather, 
national slumps in the economy, and simply bad judgment. In addition, a large number 
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of contractors' business failures can be traced to discuss of proven business (Adrian, 
1975). 
The causes of construction business failure will be discussed in detail in chapter '3'. 
In the Gaza Strip, there is evidence that the number of contractor's failure is increasing 
rapidly. 
1.11 The Palestinian Economy 
 
Palestinian economy is almost totally dependent on the economy of Israeli occupation. 
This situation was created to serve the interests of the occupying power (PECDAR, 
2001). More than 80 percent of exports are directed to Israel, from which 90 percent of 
imports originate. Palestine experiences a trade deficit with Israel because after thirty 
years of neglect, it lacks a broad, competitive industrial and agricultural base. This 
situation is further compound by Israeli restrictions on the volume, destination and 
sources of Palestinian trade (PECDAR, 2001). 
During the past two decades, more than three quarters of private investment were in 
construction (PECDAR, 2001). The construction share in GDP for WBGS had reached 
unprecedented levels. This is illustrated in Table 1.2. The distribution of GDP among 
different sectors during the year of 1994 is illustrated in Figure 1.1 (PECDAR, 1997). 
This distribution had fluctuated during time. For example, 1in 1998, the contribution of 
construction share to the GDP has been reduced to 10.63% (PCBS, 2000).  
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Table 1.2 Construction share in GDP for WBGS (PECDAR, 2001)  
Item/Years G.D.P Construction Share % 
1972 276.2 9 
1974 548.7 12 
1976 650.5 16 
1978 695.4 16 
1980 1044 16 
1982 1002 19 
1984 998.8 18 
1986 1536.7 16 
1988 1789.9 16.7 
1990 2220 21.6 
1992 2486.6 22.4 
1994 2975.23 26 
 
Data released from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) provides the first 
concrete evidence of the performance of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) 
economy in the period following the Oslo Accords. According to this data, the real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for the WBGS (excluding east Jerusalem) 
decline by 5.4% in 1966 and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) decreased by 
6.0%. The center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) conducted an opinion poll 
in November 1997 in which 47.4% of respondents said that they were worse off 
financially than they had been before the peace process and only 13.6% indicated that 
they were better off. The main economic indicators in the Gaza Strip are listed in  Table 
1.3.  
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Figure 1.1 The distribution of GDP among different sectors during the year 1994  
(PECDAR, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the distribution of labor force employed in construction industry 
from the year 1997 to 2001 (PASSIA, 2002). 
 
Figure 1.2 Labor forces employed in construction sector (PASSIA, 2002) 
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Table 1.3 Main Economic indicators in Gaza Strip (MAS, 1999). 
Indicator Year Value 
Population Mid- 1997 995,522 
Population Mid- 1998 1,093,580 
Growth rate 1998 4.40 
Labor force (thousands) Fourth quarter1998 204.63 
Employment (thousands) Fourth quarter1998 161.452 
Employment in domestic economy (thousands) Fourth quarter1998 137.782 
Employment in Israel (thousands) Fourth quarter1998 23.670 
Public employment (%) Fourth quarter1998 25.80 
Labor force participation rate (%) Fourth quarter1998 37.4 
Female labor force participation rate (%) Fourth quarter1998 6.3 
Male labor force participation rate (%) Fourth quarter1998 66.0 
Average unemployment (%) Fourth quarter1998 21.1 
GDP (million US$, current prices) 1997 1,256.3 
GNI (million US$, current prices) 1997 1,382.0 
Per-capita GDP (US$) 1997 1,388 
Final consumption from GDP (%) 1997 123.5 
Government final consumption from GDP (%) 1997 27.3 
Household final consumption from GDP (%) 1997 90.4 
Head count index (poverty/population) (%) Fourth quarter1998 37.3 
Total bank deposits (millions US$) End of Dec. 1998 602.21 
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However, economic indicators show that the actual deterioration in standards of living 
has been far more dramatic in the West Bank, with a 19.7 percent loss of per capital 
GDP compared with 8.4 percent in the Gaza Strip two years after the Oslo agreement. 
The construction sector, in contrast, enjoyed a steady increase from 1991, due to "pent-
up demand from the Intifada, and to accommodate Palestinian returnees from the Gulf 
after the Gulf War. The peace process accelerates this increase, especially after the 
return of the many Palestinians who came with the PNA," and by the fall of 1996 the 
construction sector was employing 12.6 percent of employed Palestinian workers 
(MAS, 1997). Other contribution of the work force in construction relevant to other 
sectors is illustrated in Table 1.4 (PASSIA, 2002).   
 
Table 1.4 Palestinian labor force by economic activity (%) (PASSIA, 2002) 
1997-98 1999 2000 2001 Sector 
Average Average Average WB GS Total
Agriculture forestry, hunting, 
fishing 
12.85 12.7 13.7 12.8 9.4 11.4 
Mining, manufacturing 
quarrying,  
16.17 15.5 14.3 14.6 8.8 13.3 
Construction 20.09 22.3 19.7 11.2 6.1 15.1 
Commerce, hotels, restaurants 18.77 16.8 17.5 20.4 17.6 19.0 
Transportation, storage, 
communication 
4.7 4.6 4.9 7.2 4.5 5.8 
Services and other branded 27.35 28.05 29.9 33.8 53.6 35.4 
 
1.12 Problem background  
  
For a long time the study of construction business failure has not been given much 
attention like the study of construction business success. In Gaza Strip, contractor's 
failure becomes a phenomenon and no attention is given to such subject.  
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The valid registration of the Gaza Strip contracting companies (Table 1.5) varied during 
the period from 1995 to 2000. Table 1.5 shows that the number of new registered 
companies during the period 1995-2000 is 123 companies while the number of failed 
companies is 121 companies. From the figures, the yearly average number of new 
registration of the contractor's list is 17.6 companies while the average of withdrawn 
companies is 17.3 companies. The implication that there is a balance between the newly 
registered companies in the Contractors Union and the average number of failed 
contractors keeps approximately constant average number of eligible companies. 
 
Table 1.5 Contractors registration according to PCU (PCU, 2001) 
Year Valid Registration Newly Registered Withdrawn from list 
(failure) 
1995 109 20 9 
1996 155 26 10 
1997 159 21 17 
1998 161 13 12 
1999 153 8 17 
2000 138 13 28 
2001 132 22 28 
 
The increasing number of contractor's failure makes the understanding of this issue, not 
only important but also critical. 
In this study, the factors affecting construction project failure to be determined, then 
analysis of these factors to be examined by the contractors in the Gaza Strip to 
determine the critical factors. 
1.13 Objectives of study 
 
The main objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To define the critical factors that lead to contractor's failure. Then a 
comprehensive analysis of these factors to be done. 
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2. Apply these factors to the different grades of contractors in Gaza Strip to 
identify the most sever factors causing the contractor failure in Gaza Strip. 
3. Verify if all contractors share the same point of view about the severity of 
causes of failure. 
4.  Verify if different types of specializations also agree with the severity of failure 
causes. 
5. To write a conclusion and recommendation that may minimize the contractor's 
failure. 
 
1.14 Limitation of the Study 
 
This study is limited to contractors of Gaza Strip who have valid registration in the 
contractor's union and qualified by the national (clarification) classification committee 
as of (due to) April 2002. All other organizations that have its own classification for 
contractors such as UNRWA, UNDP will be excluded. Also, contractors of first, 
second, and third class represent the population in this research, while contractors of 
fourth and fifth category will be excluded.  This study is limited to construction phase 
only. 
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Chapter 2 
Causes of failure 
The definition, causes and symptoms, models, types of failure are to be explained in this 
chapter. Also cure and prevention of types of failure is to be illustrated.  
2.1 definition of failure 
There are many definitions of failure. According to Dun and Bradstreat's annual 
Business Failure Records (1986), which provide historical data on business activities in 
USA, a business failure is defined as a business that: 
1. Ceases operation followings assignment or bankruptcy. 
2. Ceases operation with losses to creditors after such actions as foreclosure or 
attachment. 
3. Voluntarily withdraws, leaving unpaid debts; and, 
4. Are involved in court actions such as receivership, reorganization of 
arrangement or voluntarily comprising with creditors. 
5. Voluntarily compromised creditors.  
 
According to Frederikslust (1978), failure is the inability of a firm to pay its obligations 
when they are due. It mostly appears in a critical situation as a consequences of a sharp 
decline in sales, as a result of recession, the loss of an important customer, shortage of 
raw materials, deficiencies of management etc. 
Altman (1993) defined failure from the point of view of economics criteria. A company 
is considered to have failed if the realized rate of return on invested capital, with 
allowances for risk considerations, is significantly and continually lower than prevailing 
rates on similar investments. Another criterion is insufficient revenues to cover costs 
and situations where the average return on investment is below the firms cost of capital.  
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Baden-Fuller (1989) defined failure as a function of future evenents: 
л=rC-C', 
Where л = present value of anticipated profit in the coming period, 
C = residual value of the plant if scrapped now, 
r = rate of interest,  
C' = present value of anticipated capital gain in scrap value from deferring the closure. 
Storey (1994) attached a pejorative connotation to the term failure, implying either that 
the business should never have been started in the first place, or that the person was not 
competent to do so, or that the business left behind significant unpaid debt. 
Watson & Everett (1993) attributed business failure to for different situations: 
discontinuance for any reason; ceasing to trade and creditor loss; sale to prevent further 
losses; and failure to make a go of it. 
 
2.2 Causes and symptoms of failure 
The relative weight of ten major causes of business failures in U.S. identified in Figure 
2.1 (Dun and Bradstreet, 1986). Clearly from the figure, the most significant failure 
cause is economic factors. Within the economic factors category, there are five 
subcategories: 
1. Bad profits 
2. High interest rates 
3. Loss of market 
4. No customer spending 
5. No future 
Of these subcategories, bad profit is significant. Bad profits account for 74.2% of the 
failures in the economic factors category. Since economic factors account for 59.8% of 
all failures, alternatively it can be said that bad profits account for slightly over half of 
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Causes of business Failure (Business failure record 1986
CUSTOMER 1.3
CONOMIC FACTORS 59.8
ASSETS and CAPITAL 1.2
EXPERIENCE18.2
FRAUD AND NEGLECT 1.9
SALES 11.2
DISASTER 0.3
EXPENESE 6.2
all failures. Important causes of business failure in the construction industry are 
identified as: 
1. Bad profits 
2. Management incompetence and lack of experience 
3. Inadequate sales 
4. Loss of market and economic decline 
5. Difficulty collecting from customers. (Business failure record, 1977-1986; 
Quarterly business start 1978-1986). 
Figure 2.1 Causes of business failures (Business failure record 1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dun and Bradstreet listed failure factors and the percentage average of occurrence in the 
construction industry in their yearly reports. The percentages of occurrence of these 
factors over the 5-year period 1989-1993 are presented in Table 2.1. From Table 2.1, 
over 80% of failures were caused by five factors, namely 'insufficient profit' (26.72), 
'industry weakness' (22.73%), 'heavy operating expenses' (17.80%), 'insufficient capital' 
(8.29%) and 'burdensome insufficient debt' (5.93%). 
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Table 2.1 Weighted average values of failure factors (Arditi, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the change in the number of construction-business failures over the 
period from 1977-1986 in U.S.A. The figure indicates that the number of construction 
business failure increasing. A more accurate indicator of the relative health of the 
construction industry and of failure tendency is the business failure rate as shown in 
Figure 2.3. The figure shows a comparison of the change in total number of failures and 
the change in failure rate over the 1978-1986 period. This figure uses an index of 
1978=100 to equally compare the two items (Kangari, 1988). 
 
 
 
Failure factors 
 
Weighted % 
occurrence 
Budgetary issues 
Insufficient profit 
Heavy operating expenses 
Insufficient capital 
Burdensome institutional debt 
Receivable difficulties 
Human/ organizational capital issues 
Lack of business knowledge 
Lack of managerial experience 
Fraud 
Lack of line experience 
Lack of commitment 
Poor working habit 
Issues of adaptation to market conditions 
Inadequate sales 
Not completive 
Overexpansion 
Business issues 
Business conflicts 
Family problems 
Macroeconomic issues 
Industry weakness 
Poor growth prospects 
High interest rate 
Natural factors 
disasters   
Total 
 
26.72 
17.8 
8.29 
5.93 
1.46 
 
3.89 
0.91 
0.85 
0.68 
0.62 
0.59 
 
2.20 
0.29 
0.15 
 
2.43 
1.16 
 
22.73 
0.28 
0.06 
 
2.94 
100.00 
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Figure 2.2 Construction business failures (Kangari, 1988) 
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Figure 2.3 Failure index versus failure-rate index (Kangari, 1988)   
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Kangari (1988) concluded that the analysis of business failure shows that the number of 
yearly failure in the construction industry have risen 484% from 1978-1986. A more 
accurate portrayal of the status of construction industry is through the use of failure rate. 
This statistics has risen from 22 per 10,000 to 107 per 10,000, or an increase of 386% 
from 1978 to 1986. This can be attributed to low construction activity and high interest 
rates. In years of 'between' 1983 to 1988, the average age of a construction company at 
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failure has been declining and the most difficult time for a new company is the first 
three years. After that time the possibility of failure starts to drop. 
 
Abidali and Harris (1995) listed common managerial characteristic of failed companies 
as follows: 
1. Autocratic chief executive 
2. The same person as both chief executive and chairman 
3. The company board 
4. Lack of engineering skills 
5. Lack of a strong financial director 
6. Defective managerial skills 
7. Incomplete accountancy system 
8. Defective bidding system 
9. Poor marketing skills 
10. Over-trading 
11. Losses in projects 
 
John Argenti (1976) in his book 'corporate collapse' summarized what was written in 
failure. He concluded six main causes as a result of what written about the subject of 
company failure follows: 
1. Top management  
2. Accounting information  
3. Change 
4. Accounting manipulation 
5. Rapid expansion 
6. Economic cycle 
Ross and Kami (1973) in their book ' Corporate Management in Crisis' concluded that 
the most sever cause of failure is bad management, and in particular the breaking Ten 
Commandments listed below: 
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1. You must have a strategy and must communicate it. 
2. You must have overall controls and cost controls. 
3. The board must actively participate. 
4. Avoid one-man rule. 
5. Provide management depth. 
6. Keep informed and react to change. 
7. The customer is king. 
8. Do not misuse computers. 
9. Do not engage in accounting manipulations. 
10. Provide an organization structure that meets people's needs. 
 
Another list of symptoms was listed by Cohen (1973) under the title 'Confidence comes 
before a crash'. His list includes the following: 
1. Liquidity problems must be investigated- they may be sings on approaching 
disaster. 
2. It is surprising how easily credit can often be obtained. 
3. Make sure that your customer mix is not drifting towards the … payers… 
4. Keep abreast of technology. 
5. Do not put prestige above profit. 
6. Do not have too few customers. 
7. You should ask why if your growth rate is not seven or eight per cent per annum. 
8. Treat your employees as human beings. 
9. Do not over expand. 
10. Do not borrow too much or at too high interest rates. 
Cohen also notes that managers seldom seem to realize that they are of the verge on 
collapse until it actually happens. 
 
In an article called 'Causes of company failure' Hartigan (1973) listed seven main 
causes of failure. First, there is lack of capital. In the early years of a business the 
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proprietors often obtain assets on hire purchase, they seldom make allowances for early 
losses and so become highly dependent on the good will of creditors who do not always 
relish the role. Overtrading (rapid expansion in turnover not matched by an expansion 
of capital) is a frequent cause of failure especially where inadequate costing methods 
are used. Second, under costing; often there is no costing system at all and even where 
there is, such things as interested on loans or depreciation are forgotten. Third, lack of 
control; the proprietor prefers to be active himself rather than check up on other 
people's activities. Fourth, lack of advice; proprietors are reluctant to ask for advice 
from bankers, accountants, solicitors and so on. Fifth, the government; a great many 
bankrupts blame the government, but very often this is just an excuse-everyone knows 
that, without warning, tax rates change, laws are passed, credit is squeezed. Sixth, trade 
fluctuations; companies are often caught out by the business cycle, by mergers and by 
technological change. Finally, fraud; this cause is increasing. 
 
John Argenti (1976) in his book 'corporate collapse' summarized the opinion of experts 
in failure. Kenneth Cork is the senior partner of one of the largest insolvency 
accountants in Britain. He had much experience in this field. One of the main causes of 
failure, he said, is simply bad communications; the boss dose not knows what is 
happening to the business as a whole in large companies especially; great waves of 
paper deluge the chief executive with thousands of the tiny disjointed facts. 
Only occasionally does are came across a system that tells the chief executive in simple 
form what he want to know, which is how his business is doing as a whole. Another 
major cause is failure to keep up with a change in technology. Mr. Cork has a golden 
rule: never undertake a development the cost of which you cannot write off and still 
remain in existence.  
Sir Ronald Leach had an opinion on one matter is definitive: if the management of a 
company is good then company will only fail as a result of bad luck. One aspect of good 
management is to avoid overtrading. Another aspect of good management is to calculate 
one's cash flow position for months or even year ahead. Another different opinion was 
  22
of Mr Paterson who identified several causes of failure. He identified several causes of 
failure as listed below: 
1. Budgetary control 
2. Banks 
3. fraud   
Argenti (1976) summarized the results of what the writers said and his interviews with 
experts are listed: 
1. Management 
           There is wide or even universal agreement that the prime cause of failure is bad 
            management. Good managers will seldom make the same fatal mistakes as poor  
            managers or, if they do make them, their managerial ability will protect the 
            company from the worst consequences.  
2. One man rule 
     'One-man rule is intended to describe chief executive who dominate their  
      colleagues  rather than lead them, who make decisions, in spite of their hostility  
      or reticence, who allow no discussion, will hear no advice. 
3. Non-participate board  
      Many of the functional directors who sit on main boards, and many chief 
      executives of subsidiary companies who do, take little part in discussions on 
      matters affecting the company as a whole and only come alive when something  
      is discussed that bears upon their particular special area of interests. 
4. Unbalanced top team 
      The team ' top team' includes directors and very senior executives and advisers 
       below director level. The phenomenon of imbalance is plainly visible in many  
      engineering companies where not only is the chief executive an engineer but so 
      are most of the board. 
5. Weak financial function 
      A special case of unbalance in the top team, and in particular at board level, is a 
      weak finance function. This may appear as a general phenomenon throughout 
  23
      the company resulting in inadequate financial and accounting controls as 
      described below under 'Accountancy information'. 
6. Lack of management depth 
This also helps the autocrat to continue playing an exaggerated role in the 
company which is a useful indicator of possible failure. 
7. Chairman-chief executive 
The chief executive is responsible to whom? 
He used to be responsible to shareholders but as their power has waned it has 
left a vacuum at the top of the pyramid that today is filled by anyone who is able 
to fill it. Sometimes it is the government, sometimes the workers, but usually it 
is top management and often the chief executive himself. Sometimes he uses his 
double power prudently, sometimes he abuses it, sometimes he simply goes stale 
or makes a mistake. There is no one above him to shake him awake or divert 
him or warn him or dismiss him.  
8. Accounting information 
            What is lacking in companies that fail is accountancy information; lack of 
            physical  information, such as output statistics stock levels or sales by area or 
            customer complaints. Four defects are particularly mentioned. 
• budgetary control 
• cash flow forecasts 
• costing systems 
• valuation of assets 
9. Change 
Each company must have the ability to react to changes when needed. It is 
useful to place the changes into five main groups: competitive, political, social, 
economic and technological environments. Change, or rather failure to respond 
to change, is a major cause of collapse, then. The company either does not notice 
the change or does not respond correctly. Of course, some changes occur so 
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suddenly and unpredictably that the company is wrong-footed and through no 
fault of its own, collapses.   
10. Constraints 
We have now a new cause of collapse. It is the trends to emergence of an 
atmosphere almost of hostility towards companies on the part of the customer, 
the employee, the state, students, and eventually even the man in the street. The 
demand that some form of accountability to society be devised for companies 
was heard all over the world. The belief that groups of people, other than 
shareholders, should draw a benefit from companies grew and spread and the 
belief that groups of people should not be harmed by companies in the pursuit of 
profit gained wide acceptance. These new views become so strongly held and so 
widespread that the freedom of companies to respond to change was decimated. 
Constraints have now become excessive and the companies should deal with the 
world as it is. 
11. Overtrading 
Number of writers and experts pointed to overtrading as a major cause of failure. 
When a company expands it has to inject cash into stocks, debtors and other 
aspects of the business at approximately the rate at which the company as a 
whole is expanding. Collapse from overtrading can occur in several ways, of 
which two are interesting. The first strikes at healthy as well as unhealthy 
companies and arises solely because the managers underestimate the amount 
they must borrow or the time it may take to arrange the loans. The second 
definition of overtrading seems to me more convincing for it relates to the 
company which, in an attempt to expand, increases, turn-over at the expense of 
profit margins. Now, let us suppose that turnover increases faster than profits 
then, in any attempt to finance an increase in stocks, debtors, and so on with 
borrowed money, the income-gearing of the company (i.e., the amount of 
interest on the borrowings in relation to profits) will rise. No company can 
continue to do that for long without arousing the suspicions of their bankers 
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who, on losing confidence in the company, will eventually decline to extend 
further credit.  
12. The big project 
There seems to be wide agreement that one of the almost tediously repetitive 
mistakes that lead to failure is the big project where costs and times are 
underestimated or revenues overestimated. 
13. Gearing 
There are unfortunately a number of different definitions of this term, which is 
also called 'leverage' in the USA. It can mean the volume of long-term fixed-
interest loans as a percentage of total capital employed; thus a company whose 
equity is valued at $100m and has raised $30m debentures has a gearing of 23 
per cent (or 30 per cent by some calculations). High gearing is a warning signal 
that no one should ignore. 
14. Normal business hazards 
The collapse of a company is in some ways, similar to the sinking of a ship. If a 
ship is in good condition and the captain is competent it is almost impossible for 
it to be, sunk by a wave or a succession of waves. Even if there is a storm, the 
competent captain will have heard the weather forecast and taken whatever 
measures ace needed. Only a freak storm for which quite inadequate notice has 
been given will sink the ship. 
In view of this, a manager who blames an economic recession for his company's 
collapse is like a captain who has not heard the weather forecast. And what does 
that manager expect-a world without economic cycles? Some manage" blame 
the government; perhaps an increase in a tax or, some new legislation has 
'caused' the failure. But again, what does he expect-a world in which taxes and 
laws are not changed? This is like the captain of a 'hip which is grossly 
overloaded blaming a two-foot wave for the, inking-and, in one sense, he is 
right; it was a two-foot wave that sank it! But what about all the other, ships near 
by which are, still afloat? 
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15. Financial ratios 
Financial ratios are useful indicators of trouble and possibly of failure. A great 
deal of work has been done over the past several decades to establish the 
reliability of a number of financial ratios as indicators and the length of the list 
that follows is testimony to this work. 
16. Creative accounting 
Creative accounting can cause the failure of a company. While others believe   
that creative accounting is generally a symptom of failure, not a cause. To 
explain the creative accounting as a cause of failure the managers know 
perfectly well that the company is in trouble they refuse to admit it and start 
publishing the accounts in the most optimistic colour possible. They also know 
that if this becomes generally recognized the bank will tighten its credit terms, 
customers will begin to sidle away; suppliers will begin to demand cash on or 
before delivery. But worse than this the managers themselves will be seen to 
have failed. Their wives and children will see it and then their friends. A hard 
knot of anxiety ties itself in their minds  
 
17. Non-financial symptoms 
These non-financial symptoms differ for each industry and even each company. 
Generally a large number of such symptoms are displayed by failing companies. 
For example customers will note a decline in quality or service, suppliers will 
notice that the firm running down stocks of components or materials or reducing 
the size of orders, or taking longer to pay. Employees will observe the greater 
resistance to pay increases, cuts in overtime and less generous treatment 
generally, delays in capital expenditure authorizations, rising stocks, the 
outdated product, the declining market share, the growing volume of customer 
complaints and an increasing desperation among the top, and later the middle, 
management.  
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18. The last few months 
In the last few months before insolvency the number and severity of the 
symptoms rapidly increase. At least four of the phenomena beginning to 
associate with the last stages of collapse were visible in this case. The continue 
generosity of the banks up to a few weeks before insolvency. Then the frantic, 
even lunatic, scramble to scrape up some cash accompanied by and parallel 
with, a marked deterioration of operating efficiencies. Finally the dazed 
astonishment of everyone-including the board, the stock market, the banks, the 
auditors, the government, and so on-when the announcement is made. 
 
2.3 Models of failure 
A distinct and different modeling technique is presented which can be applied to 
characteristics of individual companies to determine their likelihood of business 
failures. Many models are presented, and their application in the construction industry is 
described.    
One of the pioneers of predicting business failure is Professor Edward Altman (1971, 
1983). In the late 1960s, he developed a model for predicting failure tendency using a 
sample of 66 companies. Half of these companies had gone bankrupt. By analyzing 
different financial ratios of these firms, he developed a model that would fairly well 
distinguish between which the sixty six went to bankrupt and which are not. His model 
is well known as the Z-score model, shown in the following equation" 
Z = 0.012A + 0.014B + 0.033C + 0.006D + 0.999E   
Where, 
A = working capital/total assets; 
B = retained earnings/total assets; 
C = earning before interest and taxes/total assets; 
D = market value of equity/book value of total liabilities; 
E = sales/total assets. 
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According to Altman, this model is a good indicator of bankruptcy tendency within two 
or three years from time of analysis. If the Z-score calculated was less than 1.81, this 
meant that the company was going to go failed in the next two or three years. Z-score 
greater than 2.99 meant that the company was not going to bankrupt. If the Z-score was 
between 1.81 and 2.99, the bankruptcy of the company was unclear. 
The Z-score model was developed from companies that were not involved in 
construction. The group of companies used to develop the model was consistent in size. 
No firm with assets lower than $1,000,000 was used and no firm with assets greater 
than $25,000,000 was considered. In addition, as the ratios chosen suggests, all 
companies were public. 
The model may be more applicable to construction firms with assets in the range for 
which the model was developed. 
Another model was applied by Demister (1971, 1976). His model applied the technique 
of financial-ratio to determine the failure probability in small businesses. Using zero-
one linear regression, Edmister developed the following model: 
Z = 0.951 - 0.423A - 0.23B – 0.482C + 2.77D – 0.452E – 0.352F – 0.924G   
Where, 
A = ratio of annual funds flow to current liabilities, which equal to one if the ratio is less 
0.05, but is zero otherwise; 
B = ratio of equity to scale, which equal to one if the ratio is less than 0.07, but is zero 
otherwise; 
C = ratio of net working capital to scales as described by Robert Morris Associate 
(RMA) average ratio, which is equal to one if the ratio is less than – 0.02, but is zero 
otherwise; 
D = ratio of current liabilities to equity divided by the corresponding RMA average 
ratio, which is equal to one if less than 0.48, but zero otherwise; 
E = ratio of inventory to sales divided by the corresponding RMA industry average, 
which is equal to one if the ratio has shown an upward trend, but is zero otherwise; 
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F = quick ratio divided by the trend in RMA quick ratio, which is equal to one if the 
trend is downward and the level prior to receiving the SBA loan less than 0.34, but is 
zero otherwise; and 
G = quick ratio divided by RMA quick ratio, which is equal tone if the ratio has shown 
an upward trend, but is zero otherwise. 
Using the failure criteria (if Z > 0.53, the company would not fail; and if Z < 0.53, 
failure occurs), the model predicted all of the failures and 86% of the nonfailures. 
The use of Edmister's model is a stating point, however. Its use rather than the Z-score 
model developed by Altman would apply to the vast majority of construction companies 
and could assist them in staying away from failure. 
 Figure 2.4 shows an environment/response matrix. The causes of failure of small firms 
were expressed in this matrix by Boyle and Desai (1991). The environment is 
represented on the vertical axis and is divided into two categories, internal and external 
environment. Internal environment represents the events that are under management's 
control. External environment corresponds to events that are beyond management's 
control. Response is represented on horizontal axis and also is divided into two 
categories, namely administrative responses, which represent the short-term operational 
activities, and the strategic responses, which represent the long term planning of the 
firm. This matrix is adapted to the construction industry by using the factors used in 
Dun and Bradstreet's annual Business Failure Records (1989-1993).  
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Figure 2.4 Environment/response matrix (Boyle & Desai 1991) 
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In matrix (Fig. 2.4) Cell I covers the internal-administrative factors, consists of 
budgetary and human capital issues. Cell II covers the internal-strategic factors, 
represents issues of adaptation to market conditions including sales, competitiveness, 
growth and expansion. Cell III covers the external-administrative factors, expenses 
business issues that cover the characteristics of the individuals who manage the 
companies, and business conflicts. Finally Cell IV covers the external–strategic factors, 
includes natural factors and macroeconomic issues such as industry weakness and 
interest rates. 
The issues in Figure 2.4 are expanded using factors that define each issue. These factors 
are very causes of failure whose percentages of occurrence in the construction industry 
are given by Dun and Bradstreet. The percentages of occurrence of these factors over 5-
year period 1989-93 are calculated and listed in the environment/response matrix in 
Figer 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 Environment/response matrix distribution with failure factors 
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An alternative approach to explaining the reasons of business failure in the construction 
industry is the classification of Dun and Bradstreet in the form of input/output model 
Figer 2.7. In this model, organizational and environmental factors influence a 
company's success or failure individually, jointly or indirectly through company 
performance factors. 
Beaver (1966) developed a model based on four propositions: 'the larger the reservoir, 
the smaller the probability of failure; the larger the net liquid asset flow from the 
operation (i.e. cash flow), the smaller the probability of failure; the larger the 
expenditure for operations, the greater the probability of failure; the larger the amount 
of debt held, the greater probability of failure (Arditi, Koksal & Kale, 2000)       
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Figure 2.6 Environment/response matrix distribution with failure factors for the 5-year 
period 1989-1993. 
 
CELL I 
Weighted (%) 
Occurrence 
BUDGETARY ISSUES 
Insufficient profits  ………….…. 26.71 
Heavy operating expenses ……... 17.80 
Insufficient capital ………………. 8.29 
Burdensome Institutional debt ….. 5.93 
Receivable difficulties …………... 1.46  
 
HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CAPITAL ISSUES 
Lack of business knowledge ……. 3.89 
Lack of managerial experience .… 0.91 
Fraud ……………………………..0.85 
Lack of line experience …………. 0.68 
Lack of commitment ……….…… 0.62 
Poor working habits …………...... 0.59 
CELL II 
Weighted (%) 
Occurrence  
ISSUES OF ADAPTATION TO 
MARKET CONDITIONS 
Inadequate sales …...……………. 2.20 
Not competitive………………….. 0.29 
Over expansion ………..………..  0.15 
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CELL III 
 Weighted (%) 
Occurrence 
BUSINESS ISSUES 
Business conflicts …..…………….2.43 
Family problems ………………... 1.16 
CELL IV 
 Weighted (%) 
Occurrence 
MACROECONOMIC ISSUES 
Industry weakness ………..……. 22.73 
Poor growth prospect …………… 0.28 
High interest rates ………………. 0.06 
 
Natural factors  
Disaster …………………...…….. 2.94 
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Fig. 2.7 Input/output model of business failure in the construction industry  (Ardiri, 
2000) 
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Business conflicts  
 
BUSINESS FAILURE 
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2.4 Types of failure 
There must be several very different paths or trajectories of company failure. Harvey 
described several examples of companies which failed without ever making any profits; 
at the same time Altman said that over 50% of the firms that failed were less than five 
years old (John Argenti, 1976). Roll-Royce is different example. It was a highly 
profitable company for several decades. So there are certainly three types of failure. The 
three types of failure will be described below (Figure 2.8). Type 1 failure follows a very 
low profile, indicating that its performance never rises above 'poor' before sinking. Type 
2, on the other hand, shoots upwards to 'fantastic' heights before crashing down again. 
Type 3 is a rather more complex trajectory; these companies have usually been going 
for years or decades so the start and early years are not shown. As a comparison, the 
trajectory for a healthy non-failing company which follows the well known S-curve 
consisting of a slow start, a rapid build-up and then an indefinite period of stable 'good 
to excellent' performance. 
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Figure 2.8 Types of failure ( Arginti, 1976) 
 
 
2.4.1 Description of Type 1 
Type 1 failure occurs only to companies newly formed and, almost invariably therefore, 
affect only small ones. Type 1 failure is low and brief. The general health of the 
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company probably never rises above 'poor and' and it probably fails within five years. 
At point 1 the type 1 trajectory (see figure) at the launch of the company, a number of 
defects will be seen. There will be one-man rule because the company may only have 
one manager and lack of management depth. At point 2, there will be no budget, no 
cash flow plans, and no costing system. At point 3 the company will either obtain a 
bank loans or bought equipment on hire purchase. At point 4 the company may launches 
a big project. Type 1 companies begin life with four serious defects. 
At point 5 it becomes clear that the proprietor has in fact seriously underestimated the 
cost and overestimated the revenues of the projects the company was formed to launch. 
Point 5 may well occur within months of the start of the company. At point 6, the cash 
flow are probably still negative and so are profits; all the financial ratios look poor. At 
point 7 the proprietor may begin creative accounting because he expects to have ask the 
bank for a further loan. At point 8 several other non-financial symptoms will appear. At 
point 9 a normal business hazard occurs, such as a strike. At point 10 the proprietor 
takes some form of crisis action such as cutting the selling prices to customers. At point 
11 he seeks further loans although his net assets are probably negative. Either he obtains 
more capital, in which case at point 12 he finds he cannot make enough profit to 
maintain the interest payments, or he does not; in either case the Receiver is called in 
point 13. However, the main feature of Type 1 failure, that they 'never got off the 
ground. 60 per cent of all failures are of this type. 
Figure 2.9 Type 1 failure ( Arginti, 1976) 
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2.4.2 Description of Type 2 
Type 2 failures also occur to very young companies although they usually survive 
longer than Type 1. The trajectory is wholly different from Type 1, the companies get 
off the ground. At point 1 the same management defects as in Type 1are seen. Type 2 
trajectories diverge from Type 1 at point 3. Sales continue to expand rapidly 
necessitating new capital resources (point 4) and these resources are readily made 
available (point 5). No over gearing or overtrading occurs. Offers of capital are received 
in some profusion (point 6) and sales and profits continue to rise (point 7). 
The company has reaching 'good' at point 8. At point 9 the company is noticed by the 
press and the company has to succeed because it is publicly expected to, so it has to sell 
more, so it has to borrow more, so it has to succeed more. By point 10 the company is 
now so large. At point 11, whether it has 'gone public' or not the proprietor himself is 
now extremely wealthy and his name is known. At point 12 turnover grows again-but 
this time the profit do not. No one knows that this inevitable turning point has been 
reached because creative accounting begins immediately at point 13. At point 14, then, 
we find the most entertaining non-financial symptoms. Technically they are 
overtrading, for turnover has now risen so long and so fast that the bankers begin not to 
believe their luck and, at point 16, they refuse further advances. But point 16 is on the 
downswing of the trajectory; something happens at point 15 to turn it down. Sometimes 
it is normal business hazards. The collapse is now quite swift and no creative 
accounting can stop the collapse to point 17. The Receiver is called to point 18. 
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Figure 2.10 Type 2 failure ( Arginti, 1976) 
 
 
2.4.3 Description of Type 3 
Type 3 failures occur only to mature companies which have been trading successfully 
for a number of years or decades. Type 3 failures are considerable-probably between 20 
per cent and 30 per cent of all failures. At point 1 the company has been and remains 
'good to excellent' with turnover rising soberly in real terms, profit margins good, 
gearing low, morale good and so on. At point 2 several defects must be recorded in 
management structure, namely one-man rule or non-participating board or weak finance 
function. At point 3 certain defects in the accounting information systems are noted. At 
point 4 one can observe that although a major change has occurred no adequate 
response has been made. It is well worth noting that these defects at point 2,3 and 4 are 
visible for months or years before the initial collapse occurs at point 5. An overtrade, a 
failed project, a constraint, or a hazard occur in any permutation of two or more. 
Following these events, profits fall severely at point 6. At point 7 the financial ratios 
deteriorated. At point 8 morale falls and other non-financial symptoms appear. At point 
9 profits have still not recovered even though it may not now be one or two years after 
point 5. At point 10 creative accounting begins, partly because the managers realize that 
they need a large loan. This is obtained at point 11, lifts gearing to dangerous levels. At 
point 12, profit levels out at last but at a volume that does little more than cover the 
interest payments. The general health of the company is 'poor' or a little above. At point 
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13 the managers will either launch a new ambitious project or launch a campaign to 
expand sales from existing facilities. At point 14 sales and profits will rise due to efforts 
and the apparent health of the company will improve. Point 15 is a repeat performance 
of point 5-except that, in this case the company is already waterlogged. At point 16 
profits fail to cover interest payments, a cash flow crisis occurs and all the drama of the 
last few months begins. At point 17 the Receiver is called in. 
 
Figure 2.11 Type 3 failure ( Arginti, 1976) 
  
  
A company following one trajectory could switch to another. The most obvious 
occasion for a switch is the rescue of a company. Thus Type 3 company, having 
suffered its initial collapse to point 12 might be rescued and then live happily ever after 
as shown in Figure . Type 2 might be rescued either before it becomes absurd at point 
14 (Figure ) or on its way down after the peak (see Figure ). Alternatively an entirely 
healthy company could be taken over by a manager of unusual ambition who, in his 
attempt to achieve fame and fortune breaks the company. Figure shows a switch in 
trajectory from a non-failing trajectory to Type2. Any change from one style of top 
management to another can caused a switch from trajectory to another.         
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Figure 2.12 Rescue of the three types of failure ( Arginti, 1976) 
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2.5 Prevention and cure of failure 
Type 1 companies are nearly always very small. The concern should be for the 
proprietor. When Type 1 company fails it is he who usually loses most, as it never got 
off the ground, very few other people are deeply dependent upon it. It fails because the 
proprietor has very seriously overestimated the revenues or underestimated the costs of 
his project. Type 1 failures cannot be cured. In this case prevention is better than cure.  
A completely different situation confronts us with Type 2 company failures. For one 
thing, they grow so large that a great number of people other than the proprietor become 
dependent upon them. For another, there is usually a profitable core that is well worth 
salvaging even after insolvency. Cure of Type 2 company may take many forms such as 
cutting back or selling off any unprofitable activities or a takeover may be arranged. 
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Prevention may take the form of constraining the chief executive's excesses of 
enthusiasm. 
Again the problem is different with Type 3 failure. The companies here is often large or 
medium-size one upon which a number of people have already become dependent. Both 
prevention and cure are possible; cure is possible along almost the whole length of the 
very long trajectory.          
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
This chapter includes the different methods used to identify the research strategy. 
 
3.1 The research strategy 
The research strategy can be defined as the way in which the research objectives can 
be questioned (Naoum, 1998). There are two types of research strategies, namely, 
'quantitative research' and ''qualitative research' (Naoum, 1998). Quantitative data, as 
the term suggests, consist of numerical (quantified) information (Polit & Hungler, 
1985). Quantitative research is "objective" in nature. It is selected under the 
following circumstances: 
? When you want to find facts about a concept a question or an attribute. 
? When you want to collect factual evidence and study the relationship between 
these facts in order to test a particular theory or hypothesis (Naoum, 1998). 
Qualitative research is 'subjective' in nature (Naoum, 1998). It emphases meanings, 
experiences (often verbally described) description so on. 
Qualitative data consists of detailed descriptions of people, events, situations, or 
observed behavior (Polit & Hungler, 1985). It is used when you have a limited 
amount of knowledge about the topic (Naoum, 1998). The strategy used in this thesis 
is the quantitative research because of these well known advantages such as, formal, 
descriptive, exploratory, and correlated. 
3.2 The research design 
Burns & Grove (1987) defined the term design as: 
"Some consider research design to be the entire strategy for the study, from 
identifying the problem to find plans for data collection. Other limit design to clearly 
define structural framework within which the study is implemented". The framework 
that the researcher creates is the design (Wood & Haber, 1998). The purpose of the 
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research design is to provide the plan for answering research problem (Wood & 
Haber, 1998). 
Much research in the social sciences and management spheres involves asking and 
obtaining answers to questions through conducting surveys of people by using 
questionnaires, interviews and case studies (Fellow and Liu, 1997). The 
interrelationships between problem statement, purpose, literature review, theoretical 
framework, and hypothesis are shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Interrelationship of design, problem statement, literature review, 
theoretical framework, and hypotheses (wood and Haber, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A structured questionnaire with personal interview will be used together in this 
research for their advantages (Sawalhi, 2002). The structured questionnaire is 
probably the most widely used data collection technique for conducting surveys to 
find out facts, opinions and views (Naoum, 1998). Figure 3.2 shows the research 
design.  
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Figure 3.2 Research design 
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3.3 Research population 
A population consists of the totality of the observations with which we are concerned 
(Walpole and Myers, 1998). In this research, the population is the total number of 
contractors (92 contractor) of the first, second and third category who have valid 
registration by the Contractors Union. 
 
3.4 Sample size 
Sampling is the process of selecting representative units of a population for study in 
research investigation (Wood and Haber, 1998). A statistical calculation is used to 
insure that the chosen sample fully represents the population. Registered number of 
first class is 47 companies; the second class is 32, while the third class is 13 
companies. The formula shown below was used to determine the sample size of 
unlimited population (Creative Research Systems, 2001) 
2
2 )1*(*
C
PPZss −=  
Where SS = sample size. 
Z = Z value (e.g. 1.96 for 95% confidence level) 
P = percentage picking a choice, expressed as decimal (0.5 used for sample size 
needed) 
C = confidence interval (0.5)  
3842
2
5.0
)5.01(*5.0*96.1 == −ss  
Correction for Finite Population 
New  
pop
ss
ssss 11 −+=  
Where pop = 754.74
92
13841
384 ⎯ →⎯== =−+ss  
To ensure good representation of each stratum, the following was done: 
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First class 389247*75 ==  
 
Second class 269232*75 ==  
 
Third class 119213*75 ==  
 
3.5 Limitation of the research 
The study is limited to the contractors who have valid registration through the 
Contractors Union. All other organizations who has its own classification for 
contractors such as UNRWA, UNDP, etc. will be excluded. Also, contractors of first, 
second, and third class represent the population in this research, while contractors of 
fourth and fifth category will be excluded. Finally, this study is limited to the 
contractors in Gaza Strip. 
 
3.6 Sample method   
Simple random sampling was used to represent the total sample size, since it is the 
most basic of the probability plans. A list of population was done and then 
numbered. Numbers were written on slips of paper, placed in a container, mixed well 
and then drawn out one at a time until the desired sample size has been reached. 
Table 3.1 shows the result of the previous method. 
Table 3.1 Population sample 
Class Number of companies 
(population) 
% of population Number of companies 
of sample 
First 47 50.67 38 
Second 32 34.67 26 
Third 13 14.67 11 
Total 92 100 75 
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3.7 Questionnaire design: 
A closed-ended questionnaire was used for its advantages such as: it is easy to ask 
and quick to answer, they require no writing by either respondent or interviewer, and 
their analysis is straight forward (Naoum, 1998). The factors that cause failure to 
contractors were defined through a detailed literature review. These factors were 
translated into questions of simple, easy, unambiguous form. 
Questions of similar topics were grouped together to build the main areas of the draft 
questionnaire. 
The draft questionnaire was discussed with supervisor who gave a valuable advice 
and comments. After preliminary approval of supervisors, draft questionnaire was 
discussed with two statistical experts and ten of well known construction managers 
to evaluate the content of the questionnaire. Modifications and changes have been 
done to questions.  
A pilot study was conducted which added a very important questions, clarify some 
questions and change the contents of others. The questionnaire was divided into two 
main areas: the first was the company profile and the second was the factors that 
cause contractors failure. The factors that cause contractors failure were divided into 
four main groups: 
 
? Management group    
? Financial group   
? Expansion group  
? Political group  
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List of the groups are listed in Table 3.2 below: 
 
Table 3.2 Main and sub-factors group 
No. Main Factor Group Sub-factor group 
Lack of experience in the line of work 
Lack of experience in contracts 
Bad decisions in regulating company policy 
Neglect 
Procurement practices 
Control system 
Labor productivity and improvement  
Replace key personnel 
Owner absence from the company 
Commitment 
One man rule  
Inflation in the number company employees  
Company organization  
Use of project management techniques 
Assigning site engineer  
Internal company problems  
Competent consultation  
React to change 
Using of documentation system 
Frauds  
Communication system 
Using computers applications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management group 
 
 
 
Claims  
  Depending on banks and paying high intrests 
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Cash flow management  
Lack of capital  
Low margin of profit due to competition 
Estimating practices  
Mistiming of capital expenditures 
Bills collecting effectively  
Difference of local currency exchange with 
contract currency  
Evaluation of profit yearly  
Material wastages  
Controlling equipment cost and usage  
Dealing with variation order  
 
 
 
 
2- 
 
 
 
 
Financial group 
Employee benefits and compensation 
Lack of managerial development as the 
company grow 
Increase size of projects 
Change in the type of work 
Increase number of projects 
Change work from private to public or vice 
versa  
 
 
3- 
 
 
Expansion group 
Opening a regional office in other governorates 
Absence of construction regulations 
Award contracts to lowest price 
National slump in economy 
Absence of specialized courts  
Owner involvement in construction phase 
Accounting and tax practices 
Insufficient award of contracts   
 
 
 
4- 
 
 
 
Environment group 
Bad weather  
  Delay in collecting dibs from clients 
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Closure  
Segmentation of Gaza Strip 
High cost of materials 
Lack of resources  
Limitation on importing  
Monopoly  
Banks policy 
 
 
5- 
 
 
Political group 
Dealing with suppliers and traders  
 
3.8 Validity of research 
Validity refers to the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to 
be measuring (Pilot and Hungler, 1985). High validity is the absence of systematic 
erros in the measuring instrument (Hjertzen and Toll, 2001). When an instrument is 
valid, it truly reflects the concept it is supposed to measure (Wood and Haber, 1998). 
Validity has a number of different aspects and assessment approaches (Polit and 
Hangler, 1985). Below several routes to evaluating an instrument's validity are listed: 
? Content validity 
? Criterion-related validity 
? Construct validity 
Questionnaire was reviewed by two groups of experts. The first was requested to 
identify whether the questions agreed with the scope of the items and the extent to 
which these items reflect the concept of the research problem. The other was 
requested to identify that the instrument used is valid statistically and that the 
questionnaire was designed well enough to provide relations and tests between 
variables. The two groups of experts do agree that the questionnaire was valid and 
suitable enough to measure the concept of interest with some amendments. 
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3.9 Reliability of the research 
Reliability of an instrument is the degree of consistency with which it measures the 
attribute it is supposed to be measuring (Polit & Hunger, 1985). The less variation an 
instrument produces in repeated measurements of an attribute, the higher its 
reliability. Reliability can be equated with the stability, consistency, or dependability 
of a measuring tool. The test is repeated to the same sample of people on two 
occasions and then compares the scores obtained by computing a reliability 
coefficient (Polit & Hunger, 1985). For the most purposes reliability coefficients 
above 0.7 are considered satisfactory. Period of two weeks to a month is 
recommended between two tests (Burns & Grove, 1987). 
In this study, the correlation coefficient, according to Pearson, between two 
respondents was (0.914) which is a high level of reliability and the correlation is 
significant at 0.01 level.  
3.10 Data collection 
Data collection was based on personal interviews for filing questions. The personal 
interview, which is a face-to-face process, in which the respondents were asked 
questions with a brief explanation for the ideas and contents of questionnaire, was 
conducted. The number of respondents who agreed to cooperate was 65 out of 75 
which represent 87% of the sample. 
3.11 Coding and data entry 
The use of computers requires that answers by respondents must be translated 
(coded) into numbers before the actual data analysis (Wesberg & Bowen, 1977). The 
coding process for closed-ended questions consists of recording the number of the 
response a particular respondent gave to the question (Sawalhi, 2002). The response 
categories must be mutually exclusive, so no answer can fit more than one of the 
categories (Wesberg & Bowen, 1977). A data summary sheet is needed before 
starting any form of data analysis. The actual process of transferring the data from 
questionnaire or data collection form (after the data have been collected) into a data 
  53
summary sheet is, called the 'recording scheme' or 'production coding' (Naoum, 
1998). 
3.12 Measurement scales  
In order to be able to select the appropriate method of analysis, the level of 
measurement must be understood. For each type of measurements, there is/are an 
appropriate method/s that can be applied and not others (Naoum, 1997). In this 
research, nominal and ordinal scales were used. Nominal scale is nominal numbering 
implies belonging to classification or having a particular property and a label 
(Naoum, 1998). It does not imply any idea of rank or priority. It is a conventional 
positive integer. Ordinal scale is a ranking or a rating data that normally uses integers 
in ascending or descending order. The numbers assigned to the agreement or degree 
of influence (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) don’t indicate that the interval between scales are equal, 
nor do they indicate absolute quantities. They are merely numerical labels (Naoum, 
1998). Only ordinal scale was used in this research as follows: 
1 very low influence 
2 low influences    
3 moderate influence 
4 high influence 
5 very high influence 
3.13 Data Analysis 
Analysis is an interactive process by which answers to be examined to see whether 
these results support the hypothesis underlying each question ( Backstorm and cesar, 
1981). Quantitative statistical analysis for questionnaire was done by using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The analysis of data is done to rank the severity 
of causes of contractor's failure in Gaza Strip. Ranking was followed by comparison 
of mean values within groups and for the overall sub-factors. The opinion of 
contractors regarding the severity of each cause was checked by analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). 
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The following statistical analysis steps were done: 
• Coding and defining each variable 
• Summarizing the data on recording scheme 
• Entering data to a work sheet 
• Cleaning data 
• Mean and rank of each cause 
• Comparing of mean values for each main group and overall sub-factors 
• ANOVA test was done to test the difference of answers of contractors 
regarding to variables 
• Partial correlation test was done to compare the mean values of different 
groups 
• Multi-comparison test was also done when there is a significant difference   
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Chapter 4 
Results 
The survey results are illustrated in this chapter. Mainly, the population characteristics, 
the ranking of factors affecting contactors failure, the relationships between the 
population characteristics and the factors (variables) are investigated by using statistical 
tests. 
4.1 Population characteristics 
4.1.1 Year of establishment 
Nearly more than half of contracting companies (50.8%) were established after one or 
two years of the existence of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Only (18.2%) of 
the companies were established before the existence of PNA. Table 4.1 shows the 
distribution of year of establishment of respondents. 
 
Table 4.1 Year of establishment 
 
Year 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Cumulative Percent 
1973 1 1.5 1.5 
1980 1 1.5 3.1 
1982 1 1.5 4.6 
1983 1 1.5 6.2 
1985 1 1.5 7.7 
1991 1 1.5 9.2 
1992 6 9.2 18.5 
1993 5 7.7 26.2 
1994 21 32.3 58.5 
1995 12 18.5 76.9 
1996 5 7.7 84.6 
1997 2 3.1 87.7 
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1998 1 1.5 89.2 
2000 4 6.2 95.4 
2001 3 4.6 100 
Total 65 100 
 
4.1.2 Distribution of respondent's occupation 
 
Figure 4.1 Respondent occupation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of respondent's occupation is shown in Figure 4.1 which illustrate that 
86.1% of respondents were director or vice director. This gives an indication of high 
interest of respondent and good confidence of answers. 
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4.1.3 Distribution of number of company staff 
As shown in Figure 4.2, more than half of the contractors (56.9%) have from 7-14 
employees. 32.3% of contractors have less than 7 employees, while only (10.8%) of 
contractors have more than 14 employees. This means that contractors depend on 
frequent employment of projects or they have small size organizations. 
 
Figure 4.2 Number of company staff 
 
4.1.4 Distribution of number of labors 
As shown in Figure 4.3, approximately two-third (67.7%) of contractors has less than 
50 labors. This gives an indication of the small size of organization and the small size of 
executed projects. 
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Figure 4.3 Number of company labors in the last 5 years 
 
4.1.5 Distribution of number and value of projects 
Figure 4.4 shows that 58.4% of contractors have executed less than 20 projects during 
the last five years. Figure 4.5 illustrate that 60% of contractors have completed projects 
of value less than 5 millions dollars during that period. This may be another example of 
small size organizations and economic weakness. 
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Figure 4.4 Number of executed project in the last 5 years 
Figure 4.5 Volume of work during the last 5 years 
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4.1.6 Distribution of years of experience 
Figure 4.6 shows that 81.5% of contractors have more than 5 years of experience. This 
gives a higher confidence in the quality of answers. 
 
Figure 4.6 Years of experience 
 
4.1.7 Distribution of company classification and field of work 
Figure 4.7 illustrates that 52.3% of contractors are of first class, 32.3% of them are of 
second class, while only 15.4% of them of third class. This distribution indicates that 
the requirement of classification system which leads the class A dominates is so easy. 
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Figure 4.7 Company classification 
 
Figure 4.8 shows that 63.1%  of the contractors are involved in construction building 
works, while 10.8% of them are involved in infrastructure works. Only 26.2% of 
contractors were working in both construction and infrastructure. 
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Figure 4.8 Company field of work 
 
4.2 Causes of contractors failure 
4.2.1 Main groups 
As mentioned before, the main groups of factors affecting contractor's failure were 
managerial group, financial group, expansion group, environment group, and political 
group. As illustrated in Table 4.2, the mean and ranking of each group is listed below. 
The most severe group of factors that causes contractor's failure was political group of 
mean 3.94. Expansion and environment groups had the same mean although each group 
had different sub-factors and different numbers of factors. 
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Table 4.2 Mean and ranking of main groups  
No Main group Mean Ranking 
5 Political group 3.9487 1 
2 Financial group 3.7540 2 
1 Managerial group 3.5262 3 
3 Expansion group 3.4385 4 
4 Environment group 3.4385 4 
 
4.2.2 Mean and ranking of sub-factors     
4.2.2.1 Managerial group  
The mean of each of the sub-factors of the managerial group is presented in Table 4.3 in 
a descending order. Rank of each factor is also listed. Lack of experience in the line of 
work and experience of contracting had the highest means respectively. While, claims, 
had the lowest rank in the same group.  
 
Table 4.3 Means and ranking of managerial sub-factors 
No Sub-factor Mean Rank 
1.  Lack of experience in the line of work 4.25 1 
16. Lack of experience in contracts 4.15 2 
4. Bad decisions in regulating company policy 4.03 3 
14. Neglect 3.91 4 
 8. Procurement practices 3.75 5 
   23. Control system 3.69 6 
5. Labor productivity and improvement  3.68 7 
2.  Replace key personnel 3.62 8 
     11. Owner absence from the company 3.62 8 
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21. Commitment 3.58 10 
17. One man rule  3.54 11 
18. Inflation 3.54 11 
7. Company organization  3.52 13 
6. Use of project management techniques 3.43 14 
3. Assigning site engineer  3.38 15 
10. Internal company problems  3.35 16 
22. Competent consultation  3.34 17 
20. React to change 3.25 18 
15. Using of documentation system 3.25 18 
13. Frauds  3.18 20 
19 Communication system 3.05 21 
12. Using computers applications 3.00 22 
9. Claims  2.8 23 
 
4.2.2.2 Financial group 
Mean of each of sub-factor of financial group is presented in Table 4.4 in a descending 
manner. Rank of each factor is also listed. Depending on banks and paying high profits 
and cash flow management had the highest means respectively. While benefits and 
compensations of employees had the lowest rank in the same group.  
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Table 4.4 Means and ranking of financial sub-factors 
No Sub-factor Mean Rank 
13. Depending on banks and paying high interests 4.32 1 
2. Cash flow management  4.26 2 
10. Lack of capital  4.26 3 
1. Low margin of profit due to competition 4.22 4 
3. Estimating practices  4.03 5 
11. Mistiming of capital expenditures 4.00 6 
5. Bill and collecting effectively  3.92 7 
12. Difference of local currency exchange with 
contract currency  
3.75 8 
7. Evaluation of profit yearly  3.34 9 
9. Material wastages  3.32 10 
6. Controlling equipment cost and usage  3.29 11 
4. Dealing with variation order  3.26 12 
8. Employee benefits and compensation 2.77 13 
  
4.2.2.3 Expansion group 
There are 6 sub-factors under the expansion group outlined in table 4.5. ' Lack of 
managerial development as the company growth' and ' Increase size of projects' were 
ranked at the first and second positions with mean ranks of 3.98 and 3.62 respectively. 
At the middle 'change in type of work' and 'increase number of projects' were ranked in 
the therid and fourth positions three and four. Both 'Opening a regional office in other 
governorates' and 'Change work from private to public or vice versa' were ranked at 
position 5 and 6 with mean rank of 2.69 and 2.74 respectively.  
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Table 4.5 Means and ranking of expansion group sub-factors 
No Sub-factor Mean Rank 
5. Lack of managerial development as the company 
growth 
3.98 1 
3. Increase size of projects 3.62  2 
4. Change in the type of work 3.58 3 
2. Increase number of projects 3.38 4 
6. Change work from private to public or vice versa  2.74 5 
1. Opening a regional office in other governorates  2.69 6 
 
4.2.2.4 Environment group 
There are 8 sub-factors listed under the environment group shown in table 4.6. The 
highest three causes are 'absence of construction regulations', ' award contracts to lowest 
price' National slumpin economy'. On the other hand, the lowest three causes are 'bad 
weather', 'insufficient award of contracts' and 'accounting and tax practices'.       'Owner 
involvement in construction phase' is at the middle.     
Table 4.6 Means and ranking of environment sub-factors 
No Sub-factor Mean Rank 
2. Absence of construction regulations 4.22 1 
3. Award contracts to lowest price 4.15 2 
1.  National slump in economy 4.02 3 
4. Absence of specialized courts  3.65 4 
5. Owner involvement in construction phase 3.28 5 
7. Accounting and tax practices 3.11 6 
8. Insufficient award of contracts   2.88 7 
6. Bad weather  2.22 8 
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4.2.2.5 Political group 
Table 4.7 illustrates ranking of 9 sub-factors under political group. Most causes has 
been ranked with high means. The highest four mean ranks are: 'Delay in collecting dibs 
from donors clients', 'closure', 'segmentation of Gaza Strip' and 'high cost of materials' 
with mean ranks of 4.45, 4.37, 4.25 and 4.03 respectively. While the lowest three mean 
ranks are: 'dealing with suppliers and traders', 'banks policy' and 'monopoly' with mean 
ranks of 3.34, 3.65 and 3.74 respectively. 
 
Table 4.7 Means and ranking of political sub-factors 
No Sub factor Mean Rank 
9. Delay in collecting dibs from donors 4.45 1 
1.  Closure  4.37 2 
2.  Segmentation of Gaza Strip 4.25 3 
5. High cost of materials 4.03 4 
6. Lack of resources  3.91 5 
8. Limitation on importing  3.82 6 
4. Monopoly  3.74 7 
3. Banks policy 3.65 8 
7. Dealing with suppliers and traders  3.34 9 
 
4.2.2.6 Over-all ranks of all sub-factors causing failure 
Table 4.8 outlines the factors affecting contractor's failure in descending manner. It 
indicates that the five sever factors are "delay in collecting dibs from clients, closure, 
banks policy, cash flow management, and lack of capital" with mean ranks 4.45, 4.37, 
4.32, 4.26, and 4.26 respectively. All of these factors are related to political group or 
financial group. Although "delay in collecting dibs from donors, banks policy due to 
Intifada" are listed under political group, they are directly related to finance. It has been 
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noticed that the "bad weather, opening a regional office in other governorates, change 
work from private to public or vice versa, employee benefits and compensation, and 
claims" are the lowest five factors that causing contractor's failure with mean ranks 
2.22, 2.69, 2.74, 2.77, 2.8 respectively.  
  
Table 4.8 Overall means and ranks of  all sub-factors  
Sub factor Mean Rank 
Delay in collecting dibs from donors 4.45  1 
Closure  4.37 2 
 Depending on banks and paying high profits 4.32 3 
Lack of capital 4.26 4 
      Cash flow management  4.26 4 
      Lack of experience in the line of work 4.25 5 
Segmentation of Gaza Strip 4.25 5 
Absence of construction regulations 4.22 6 
      Low margin of profit due to competition 4.22 6 
Award contracts to lowest price 4.15 7 
      Lack of experience in contracts 4.15 7 
      Bad decisions in regulating company policy 4.03 8 
High cost of materials 4.03 8 
      Estimating practices  4.03 8 
National slump in economy 4.02 9 
      Mistiming of capital expenditures 4.00 10 
      Lack of managerial development as the  
      company growth 
3.98 11 
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      Bill and collecting effectively  3.92 12 
Lack of resources  3.91 13 
      Neglect 3.91 13 
Limitation on importing  3.82 14 
      Difference of local currency exchange with 
      contract currency  
3.75 15 
      Procurement practices 3.75 15 
Monopoly  3.74 16 
      Control system 3.69 17 
      Labor productivity and improvement  3.68 18 
      Company organization  3.68 18 
Banks policy 3.65 19 
Absence of specialized courts  3.65 19 
      Replace key personnel 3.62 20 
      Owner absence from the company 3.62 20 
      Increase size of projects 3.62 20 
      Commitment 3.58 21 
      Change in the type of work 3.58 21 
      One man rule  3.54 22 
      Inflation 3.54 22 
      Use of project management techniques 3.43 23 
      Assigning site engineer  3.38 24 
      Assigning site engineer  3.38 24 
      Internal company problems  3.35 25 
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      Evaluation of profit yearly  3.34 26 
      Competent consultation  3.34 26 
Dealing with suppliers and traders  3.34 26 
      Material wastages  3.32 27  
      Controlling equipment cost and usage  3.29 28 
Owner involvement in construction phase 3.28 29 
      Dealing with variation order  3.26 30 
      React to change 3.25 31 
      Using of documentation system 3.25 31 
      Frauds  3.18 32 
      Communication system 3.05 33 
      Using computers applications 3.00 34 
Insufficient award of contracts   2.88 35 
      Claims  2.8 36 
      Employee benefits and compensation 2.77 37 
      Change work from private to public or vice 
       versa  
2.74 38 
      Opening a regional office in other 
      governorates  
2.69 39 
Bad weather  2.22 40 
   
4.2.2.7 The highest ten causes of failure 
The highest ten factors that cause contractor's failure and related group are illustrated in 
Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9 The highest ten factors of failure  
Sub-factor Mean Rank 
Delay in collecting dibs from donors 4.45  1 
Closure  4.37 2 
Depending on banks and paying high profits 4.32 3 
Lack of capital 4.26 4 
Cash flow management  4.26 4 
Lack of experience in the line of work 4.25 5 
Segmentation of Gaza Strip 4.25 5 
Absence of construction regulations 4.22 6 
Low margin of profit due to competition 4.22 6 
Award contracts to lowest price 4.15 7 
Lack of experience in contracts 4.15 7 
 
4.3 Relationship between  population characteristics and main groups      
The One-Way ANOVA procedure produces a one-way analysis of variance for a 
quantitative dependent variable by a single factor (independent) variable.  Analysis of 
variance is used to test the hypothesis that several means are equal. This technique is an 
extension of the two-sample t test.  
In addition to determining that differences exist among the means, you may want to 
know which means differ.  There are two types of tests for comparing means: a priori 
contrasts and post hoc tests. Contrasts are tests set up before running the experiment and 
post hoc tests are run after the experiment has been conducted. You can also test for 
trends across categories.    
Statistics for each group: number of cases, mean, standard deviation, standard error of 
the mean, minimum, maximum, and 95% confidence interval for the mean. Levene’s 
test for homogeneity of variance,  analysis-of-variance table for each dependent 
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variable, user-specified a priori contrasts, and post hoc range  tests and multiple 
comparisons Bonferroni test.   
4.3.1 Relationship between position and main groups 
Table shows that there is no significant difference between those who filled the 
questionnaire and the results obtained since α is more than 0.05. In other words, despite 
who filled the questionnaire, the director, the vice director, the project manager, or the 
site or office engineer, the same point of view regarding the severity of causes of 
contractor's failure were resulted. The results show that we accept the null hypothesis 
that the means of all levels are equal, which means that there is no significant difference 
between the mean of the levels.    
 
Table 4.10 One-way ANOVA (position and main groups)      
ANOVA
1.357 3 .452 1.101 .356
25.059 61 .411
26.415 64
.429 3 .143 .478 .699
18.248 61 .299
18.677 64
.213 3 7.107E-02 .059 .981
73.872 61 1.211
74.085 64
.371 3 .124 .315 .815
23.977 61 .393
24.348 64
2.033 3 .678 1.235 .305
33.475 61 .549
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 
 
 
4.3.2  Relationship between number of employees and main groups 
Looking at the data in table, all values of α is more than 0.05. This indicates that despite 
the company size the results are the same.       
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 Table 4.11 One-way ANOVA (number of employees and main groups)      
ANOVA
1.078 3 .359 .866 .464
25.337 61 .415
26.415 64
2.146 3 .715 2.640 .057
16.530 61 .271
18.677 64
5.777 3 1.926 1.720 .172
68.308 61 1.120
74.085 64
.928 3 .309 .806 .495
23.419 61 .384
24.348 64
.222 3 7.414E-02 .128 .943
35.285 61 .578
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 
4.3.3 Relationship between number of projects and main groups  
No significant difference between the numbers of projects executed and the results 
obtained.  
Table 4.12 One-way ANOVA (number of projects and main groups 
ANOVA
.435 4 .109 .251 .908
25.980 60 .433
26.415 64
1.021 4 .255 .868 .489
17.656 60 .294
18.677 64
4.226 4 1.057 .907 .465
69.859 60 1.164
74.085 64
.371 4 9.274E-02 .232 .919
23.977 60 .400
24.348 64
1.511 4 .378 .667 .618
33.996 60 .567
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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ANOVA
2.679 4 .670 1.693 .163
23.737 60 .396
26.415 64
2.402 4 .601 2.214 .078
16.275 60 .271
18.677 64
4.379 4 1.095 .942 .446
69.706 60 1.162
74.085 64
2.936 4 .734 2.057 .098
21.412 60 .357
24.348 64
1.952 4 .488 .873 .486
33.555 60 .559
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
4.3.4 Relationship between years of experience and main groups 
No significant difference between the years of experience of the company and the 
results obtained.  
Table 4.13 One-way ANOVA (years of experience and main groups) 
ANOVA
.326 3 .109 .254 .858
26.089 61 .428
26.415 64
.880 3 .293 1.006 .397
17.797 61 .292
18.677 64
1.249 3 .416 .349 .790
72.836 61 1.194
74.085 64
1.704 3 .568 1.531 .216
22.643 61 .371
24.348 64
2.373 3 .791 1.456 .235
33.134 61 .543
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 
4.3.5 Relationship between volume of work and main groups 
No significant difference between the volume of work of the company and the results 
obtained.  
Table 4.14 One-way ANOVA (volume of work and main groups) 
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4.3.6 Relationship between company classification and main groups 
Table shows that there is significant difference between company classification and the 
variable or causes of financial group since α is less than 0.05. Although, the value of   α 
= 0.045 of managerial group which is less than 0.05, it is considered that there is no 
significant difference when the value is approximated to two digits. To determine which 
classes have significant difference, multiple comparison test is conducted as shown in 
section 4.5. 
  
 Table 4.15 One-way ANOVA (company classification and main groups) 
ANOVA
2.512 2 1.256 3.258 .045
23.903 62 .386
26.415 64
1.970 2 .985 3.656 .032
16.707 62 .269
18.677 64
3.305 2 1.653 1.448 .243
70.780 62 1.142
74.085 64
.291 2 .146 .375 .689
24.056 62 .388
24.348 64
2.071 2 1.036 1.920 .155
33.436 62 .539
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
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EXPGROUP
8.84
5.00
4.50
4.33
4.17
4.00
3.83
3.67
3.50
3.33
3.17
3.00
2.83
2.67
2.50
2.33
2.00
1.83
1.67
1.00
C
ou
nt
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
4.3.7 Relationship between company field of work and main groups 
No significant difference between company field of work and the results obtained. 
  
Table 4.16 One-way ANOVA (company field of work and main groups) 
ANOVA
.745 2 .372 .900 .412
25.670 62 .414
26.415 64
1.089 2 .544 1.919 .155
17.588 62 .284
18.677 64
6.643E-02 2 3.322E-02 .028 .973
74.019 62 1.194
74.085 64
1.342 2 .671 1.809 .172
23.005 62 .371
24.348 64
2.560 2 1.280 2.408 .098
32.948 62 .531
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
 
4.3.8 Comparing variance of expansion group and environment group 
 Since expansion and environment groups have the same average mean, variance is 
calculated to determine the difference of the two groups. 
 
Figure 4.9 Variance of expansion group 
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ENVGROUP
5.00
4.75
4.38
4.25
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Figure 4.10 Variance of environment group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Multiple comparisons 
From Table 4.17, one can conclude that the variance of the difference levels are equal 
from the homogeneity of variance test since significant difference is larger than α in all 
cases which is a necessary condition for using parametric tests.  
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
.077 2 62 .926
.400 2 62 .672
1.882 2 62 .161
.234 2 62 .792
.267 2 62 .766
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Levene
Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
 
 
Table shows that there is at least significant difference between the mean of two of the 
financial group. Bonbferroni analysis indicates that the significant difference is between 
the first and second class. The mean of the answers of questions in financial group of 
second class contractors are better than the mean of the answers of the first class 
contractors because the mean difference between them is 0.3881.   
Mean 
N
um
be
r o
f  
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
Table 4.17 Test of homogeneity of Variances 
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ANOVA
2.512 2 1.256 3.258 .045
23.903 62 .386
26.415 64
1.970 2 .985 3.656 .032
16.707 62 .269
18.677 64
3.305 2 1.653 1.448 .243
70.780 62 1.142
74.085 64
.291 2 .146 .375 .689
24.056 62 .388
24.348 64
2.071 2 1.036 1.920 .155
33.436 62 .539
35.507 64
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
  
Multiple Comparisons
Bonferroni
-.3794 .1723 .094 -.8035 4.462E-02
.1308 .2234 1.000 -.4189 .6804
.3794 .1723 .094 -4.4616E-02 .8035
.5102 .2386 .109 -7.6836E-02 1.0972
-.1308 .2234 1.000 -.6804 .4189
-.5102 .2386 .109 -1.0972 7.684E-02
-.3881* .1441 .027 -.7426 -3.3612E-02
-.1069 .1867 1.000 -.5664 .3526
.3881* .1441 .027 3.361E-02 .7426
.2812 .1994 .491 -.2095 .7720
.1069 .1867 1.000 -.3526 .5664
-.2812 .1994 .491 -.7720 .2095
-.4922 .2965 .306 -1.2219 .2375
-5.0010E-02 .3844 1.000 -.9958 .8958
.4922 .2965 .306 -.2375 1.2219
.4422 .4105 .857 -.5680 1.4523
5.001E-02 .3844 1.000 -.8958 .9958
-.4422 .4105 .857 -1.4523 .5680
-.1250 .1729 1.000 -.5504 .3004
-.1500 .2241 1.000 -.7014 .4014
.1250 .1729 1.000 -.3004 .5504
-2.5000E-02 .2393 1.000 -.6139 .5639
.1500 .2241 1.000 -.4014 .7014
2.500E-02 .2393 1.000 -.5639 .6139
-.3195 .2038 .366 -.8210 .1821
-.4190 .2642 .354 -1.0690 .2311
.3195 .2038 .366 -.1821 .8210
-9.9470E-02 .2822 1.000 -.7938 .5948
.4190 .2642 .354 -.2311 1.0690
9.947E-02 .2822 1.000 -.5948 .7938
(J) COMP_CLS
second class
third class
first class
third class
first class
second class
second class
third class
first class
third class
first class
second class
second class
third class
first class
third class
first class
second class
second class
third class
first class
third class
first class
second class
second class
third class
first class
third class
first class
second class
(I) COMP_CLS
first class
second class
third class
first class
second class
third class
first class
second class
third class
first class
second class
third class
first class
second class
third class
Dependent Variable
MANGROUP
FINGROUP
EXPGROUP
ENVGROUP
POLGROUP
Mean
Difference
(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
95% Confidence Interval
The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.*.  
Table 4.18 ANOVA test for main groups 
Table 4.19 Multiple comparisons (Bonbferroni analysis) 
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4.4 Partial correlation coefficients 
Partial correlation coefficient test was conducted between groups to determine the 
relationship between one group to others. The value or r is between zero and one when 
r> 0-0.5 a weak positive relationship between groups is found. When r> 0.5-1 a strong 
positive relationship is found. When r> -0.5-0.0 weak inverse relationship is found and 
when r> -0.5-(-1) a strong inverse relationship is found.  
 
4.4.1 Partial correlation coefficients (position and main groups) 
    
Controlling for POSITON 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7160      .4413      .3845      .4145 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .002    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7160     1.0000      .4220      .6165      .5021 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4413      .4220     1.0000      .2974      .2139 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .017    P= .090 
 
ENVGROUP       .3845      .6165      .2974     1.0000      .6381 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .002    P= .000    P= .017    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4145      .5021      .2139      .6381     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .090    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
  80
4.4.2 Partial correlation coefficients (number of labors and main groups) 
    
Controlling for number of employees 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7322      .4377      .3910      .4124 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7322     1.0000      .3832      .6295      .5144 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .002    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4377      .3832     1.0000      .2957      .2175 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .002    P= .       P= .018    P= .084 
 
ENVGROUP       .3910      .6295      .2957     1.0000      .6379 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .018    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4124      .5144      .2175      .6379     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .084    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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4.4.3 Partial correlation coefficients (number of projects and main groups) 
   
 
Controlling for number of number of projects executed  
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7236      .4327      .3916      .4161 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7236     1.0000      .4048      .6267      .5186 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4327      .4048     1.0000      .2967      .2222 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .017    P= .078 
 
ENVGROUP       .3916      .6267      .2967     1.0000      .6396 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .017    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4161      .5186      .2222      .6396     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .078    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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4.4.4 Partial correlation coefficients (years of experience and main groups)   
 
Controlling for years of experience 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7226      .4361      .3931      .4124 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7226     1.0000      .4209      .6259      .5034 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4361      .4209     1.0000      .2977      .2140 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .017    P= .089 
 
ENVGROUP       .3931      .6259      .2977     1.0000      .6381 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .017    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4124      .5034      .2140      .6381     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .089    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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4.4.5 Partial correlation coefficients (volume of work and main groups)       
 
Controlling for volume of work 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7295      .4453      .3905      .4062 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7295     1.0000      .4179      .6242      .5154 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4453      .4179     1.0000      .3015      .2273 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .015    P= .071 
 
ENVGROUP       .3905      .6242      .3015     1.0000      .6387 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .015    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4062      .5154      .2273      .6387     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .071    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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4.4.6 Partial correlation coefficients (company classification and main groups)   
 
Controlling for company classification 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7260      .4350      .3908      .4154 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .001 
 
FINGROUP       .7260     1.0000      .4128      .6149      .4813 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4350      .4128     1.0000      .2909      .1999 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .020    P= .113 
 
ENVGROUP       .3908      .6149      .2909     1.0000      .6345 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .020    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4154      .4813      .1999      .6345     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .113    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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4.4.7 Partial correlation coefficients (company major and main groups)   
 
Controlling for company field of work 
 
            MANGROUP   FINGROUP   EXPGROUP   ENVGROUP   POLGROUP 
 
MANGROUP      1.0000      .7229      .4362      .3985      .4311 
             (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .       P= .000    P= .000    P= .001    P= .000 
 
FINGROUP       .7229     1.0000      .4228      .6194      .5049 
             (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .       P= .001    P= .000    P= .000 
 
EXPGROUP       .4362      .4228     1.0000      .3049      .2298 
             (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62)    (   62) 
             P= .000    P= .001    P= .       P= .014    P= .068 
 
ENVGROUP       .3985      .6194      .3049     1.0000      .6276 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0)    (   62) 
             P= .001    P= .000    P= .014    P= .       P= .000 
 
POLGROUP       .4311      .5049      .2298      .6276     1.0000 
             (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (   62)    (    0) 
             P= .000    P= .000    P= .068    P= .000    P= . 
 
(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance) 
 
" . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
This study is to determine the causes of contractor's failure in Gaza Strip. Then, 
determine the severity of each factor from the contactor's point of view. In this chapter 
the results and findings of this research are discussed in detail and compared with the 
results and findings of available similar studies. 
5.1 Sample size characteristics  
The sample size of this research was selected randomly to represent the study 
population of first, second and third class categories of contracting companies who had 
valid registration in Gaza Contracting Union. This sample size was calculated using 
Creative Research Systems (2001). The results showed that the sample size is consisting 
of 52.3% first class contractors, 32.3% second class contractors, while only 15.4% of 
them are of third class. This distribution indicates that the requirement of classification 
system which leads the class A dominates is so easy and more regulations to be done to 
normally distribute contractors among the first three categories. The sample size 
selected was 75 contracting companies which is considered sufficient and meets the 
statistical requirements of Hoog and Tannis (1997) and also meets with what has been 
written by Grove and Burns (1993) that the sample size should contain at least 30 
subjects. The number of respondents was 65 companies out of 75 which represent 
approximately 86.67 %. This rate is considered high compared with the norm of 60-
70% of most structured interview questionnaire in construction industry as outlined by 
Naoum (1998). This also reflects the high importance given by contracting companies 
to this subject which directly affect not only their work but also their existence. 
The results showed that 41 contractors (63.1%) field of work was in construction. While 
only 7 companies (10.8%) line of work was infrastructure.  This is because construction 
works do not require heavy machines and equipments. Also, construction works in Gaza 
Strip depend mainly on sub-contractors.     
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The results show that only 17 contracting companies (26.2%) were established before 
the existence of Palestinian National Authority PNA in 1994. While the remaining 48 
(74.8%) companies were established later on. The sample of this study has better 
distribution than the sample considered by Madi (2003) since only (11.5%) of 
companies was established after the PNA existence. 
This indicates that the most contracting companies in Gaza Strip are newly established 
and as they have less than 10 years of experience in the line of work. More details about 
years of experience were shown in Figure 4.6. The Figure shows that (18.5%) of 
companies had experience less than 3 years. 32.3% of companies had experience of 5 to 
10 years. While 49.2% had experience in the line of work more than 10 years. This 
contradiction between the year of establishment and the years of experience could be 
understood as some companies executed work before their official existence. 
Comparing results with Type 1 failures discussed in literature review that shows that 
over 50 per cent and perhaps as many as 60 per cent of all failures are of this type. Type 
1 failure occurs to companies of maximum 8 years of experience. This explains the high 
rate of contractor's failure in the Gaza Strip.  
The results showed that there is no significant difference due to year of establishment of 
a firm in relation to the causes of failure from contractor's point of view. This implies 
that the contractors do not have benefits from the long period of experience in their line 
of work.  
It has been found that the majority of contracting companies (89.2%) have small 
number of staff members of less than 14 employees. While only 7 companies (18.8%) 
have more than 14 employees. This result is supported by the Federation of Palestinian 
Chambers that 82% of construction firms are of small size with less than 10 employees. 
This indicates that contracting companies have simple organizations and could be 
considered small size firms according to the definition of small size enterprises shown 
in Table 5.1. Also no significant difference referred to size of company staff members 
and the contractor's point of view regarding to the severity of causes of contractor's 
failure. 
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Table 5.1 number of employees as a criterion for the definition of small enterprises 
 
country Number of employees 
Greece 9 
Turkey 10 
Kuwait 10 
Iraq 10 
Norway 19 
Egypt 35 
Jordan 35 
Morocco 49 
Saudi Arabia 49 
Brazil 100 
India 100 
ILO 49 
Malaysia 49 
Australia 20 
Occupation of Israel Less than 70 
 
Results showed that 24 companies (58.5%) had executed less than 20 projects during 
the last five years with an average of 4 projects per year. only 5 companies (7.7%) of 
companies have executed more than 40 projects with an average of 8 projects per year. 
Moreover, 89.2% of contracting companies have executed projects with value less than 
five million dollars during the last five years. It indicates that the average workload 
equals 1 million dollars per year which considered very small compared with other 
studies. 
The results showed that there is no significant difference due to the number of projects 
executed or the volume of work in relation to the causes of failure. This may be 
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explained by that the execution of more projects give no real experience to contractors 
and that they did not improve their managerial and financial capabilities with time. 
The work force of 44 companies (67.7%) of companies was less than 50 labors. Only 2 
companies (3.1%) had a work force of more than 250 labors. It is another evidence that 
the majority of firms in Gaza Strip are of small size. 
5.2 Causes of failure 
This study has been conducted to determine the severity of 53 factors that cause failure 
to contractors in the Gaza Strip. The causes have been selected by a careful review of 
the literature review and previous studies of the same or similar subject. Many causes 
were listed after pilot study was conducted to coincide with the local market. 
The 53 sub-factors were divided into five major groups as follows: 
• Managerial group 
• Financial group 
• Expansion group 
• Environment group  
• Political group 
Political factors usually listed under the environment group. Here, these causes were 
separated to give the special case that Palestinians live in the Gaza strip and the West 
Bank (GSWB) under occupation. Political causes may directly affect the contractor's 
failure such as closure and segmentation of Gaza Strip or indirectly affect failure such 
as bank's policy and dealing with suppliers. 
5.2.1 Managerial group 
The results showed that the mean of managerial sub-factors group was 3.5262. While 
the mean of overall sub-factors group was 3.6212. The Managerial sub-factors that had 
means more than the average mean of overall sub-factors were: 
• Lack of experience in the line of work 
• Lack of experience in contracts 
• Bad decisions in regulating company policy  
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• Neglect  
• Procurement practices  
• Control system 
• Labor productivity and improvement 
The previous sub-factors are considered the most important causes under the managerial 
group. This result was supported by the results of Arditi, Koksal, and Kale (2000) in 
their study that the organizational (managerial) factors represent only 17.14% of 
business factors. 
All contractors had the same trend towards the managerial sub-factors and no 
significant difference had been appeared in results. 
It seemed from results that the lowest managerial sub-factors were: 
• Claims 
• Using computers application  
• Communication system 
• Fraud 
• Using documentation system 
The argument regarding that the causes above are directly related to company size. 
When the company is small of size, its need to claims, computer applications, 
communication system, and using documentation system will be much lower than large 
companies. Also, the direct and close control minimizes fraud in such firms. 
5.2.2 Financial group 
The results illustrated that the mean of financial group 3.752 which is higher than the 
mean of overall causes of failure (3.6212). The results demonstrated that the following 
financial causes had means over the average mean of overall sub-factors: 
• Depending on banks ad paying high profits 
• Cash flow management 
• Lack of capital  
• Estimating practices 
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• Mistiming of capital expenditure 
• Bill and collecting effectively 
• Different of local currency exchange with contract currency 
This was supported by many studies. The study of Arditi, Koksal, and Kale (2000) gives 
the financial factors weight of 56.82% of construction business failure. They concluded 
that over 80% of the failures were caused by five factors, namely 'insufficient profits' 
(26.71%), 'industry weakness' (22.73%), 'heavy operating expenses' (17.8%), 
'insufficient capital' (8.29%), and 'burdensome institutional debt' (5.93%). All of these 
factors, except 'industry weakness', are financial factors. 
Results showed that the following financial causes had the lowest means: 
• Employee's benefits and compensations 
• Dealing with variation orders 
• Controlling equipment cost and usage 
• Material wastages 
• Evaluation of profit yearly 
These causes related to organizational behavior. According to Argenti (1976), small 
firms don’t pay as much attention to financial ratios as do larger firms. Small firms has 
not an accounting department that publishes reports on a regular basis and therefore, 
financial ratios are difficult to monitor since they hire private accountants. Gaza strip 
small firms never put into consideration the employee's benefits and compensations, 
variation orders, controlling equipment cost and usage, material wastages and yearly 
evaluating profits as a priority which may affect the financial situation of the company. 
5.2.3 Expansion group 
Only 6 factors were listed under expansion group. The average mean of these factors 
was found to be 3.4385 compared with the overall sub-factors average mean of 3.6212. 
Only two factors had means over or equal to the mean of overall sub-factors. They are: 
• Lack of managerial development as the company grow 
• Increase size of projects 
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The first factor under expansion group with mean equal to 3.98 is related to the 
capability of the company to adjust itself when it must do. It is directly related to 
managerial development while company under expansion. In the study of Arditi, 
Koksal, and Kale (2000), over expansion factor causing construction business failure 
had a weighted average occurrence value of only 0.15% of the total failure factors.  A 
number of writers and experts mentioned that the increase of the size of projects as a 
potent cause of collapse. There seems to be wide agreement that one of the almost 
tediously repetitive mistake that lead to failure is the big project where costs and times 
are underestimated or revenues overestimated. In Gaza Strip, most projects are 
considered small in size. 
Opening a regional office in other governorates had the lowest rank since the Gaza strip 
is small enough to be considered as one governorate. Also a few companies open a 
regional office in the WB. All other causes had a relatively small means as shown in 
chapter 4. Over expansion can drive a company to higher risk-investment with financial 
debt, hence increasing its chances of failure. Construction contractors must avoid the 
increase of the number of projects that the company cannot afford both organizationally 
and financially. Over expansion may mean that the company is employing too many 
employees and owns too much equipment, none of which the company is capable of 
financing.   
5.2.4 Environment group 
There are 8 sub-factors listed under the environment group. These factors are: 
• National slump in economy 
• Absence of construction regulations 
• Award contract to lowest price 
• Absence of specialized courts 
• Owner involvement in construction phase 
• Bad weather 
• Accounting and tax practices 
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• Insufficient award of contracts 
The average mean of the above sub-factors are 3.4385 which is less than the average 
mean of overall sub-factors. The environment sub-factors that have means higher than 
the average overall mean are: 
• Absence of construction regulations 
• Award contract to lowest price 
• National slump in economy 
• Absence of specialized courts 
While the other sub-factors had relatively low means. The environment study of Arditi, 
Koksal, and Kale had given the environment factors 20.01% of all factors causing 
failure. One of the reasons that the ranks of the environment sub-factors in this study are 
relatively low is because the political sub-factors which had the highest average mean 
were sent into separate group. 
The fact that the environment and the expansion groups had equaled means is a 
common case in statistics. When means are equal, the best comparison of two sets of 
data is the variance. The variance of the expansion group is shown in Figure 5.1 and the 
variance of the environment group is shown in Figure 5.2.     
 
Figure 5.1 variance of expansion group 
EXPGROUP
8.84
5.00
4.50
4.33
4.17
4.00
3.83
3.67
3.50
3.33
3.17
3.00
2.83
2.67
2.50
2.33
2.00
1.83
1.67
1.00
C
ou
nt
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
 
 
N
um
be
r o
f  
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
Mean    
  94
Figure 5.2 variance of environment group 
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From Figure 5.1 and Figure5.2, the variance of the environment group shows that data 
of environment group has better distribution than the data of expansion group. 
5.2.5 Political group 
There are 9 sub-factors listed under the political group with average mean of 
3.9487.Eight out of nine of political group sub-factors have means higher than the 
average mean of the overall sub-factors. These sub-factors are listed below: 
• Delay in collecting debts from donors 
• Closure 
• Segmentation of Gaza Strip 
• High cost of materials 
• Lack of resources 
• Limitations on importing 
• Monopoly 
• Banks policy 
The above factors were rated according to their severity as causes of construction 
business failure. It has been noted that all political sub-factors except 'dealing with 
suppliers and traders' have been rated with high mean ranks of 4.45, 4.37, 4.25, 4.03, 
3.91, 3.82, 3.74, and 3.65 respectively. 
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Most of projects in PNA are funded by donors. During Al-aqsa Intifada, construction 
companies have traditionally complained delay in collecting debts from donors as a 
direct impact of local business political environment. This cause is also directly related 
to cash flow management. With lack of capital and lack of financial resources, delay of 
collecting debts from donors makes the negative effect much worse. Closure has a mean 
of 4.37. The direct impact of external closure is a large reduction in labor income and 
serious disruptions to the flow of imports and exports. The internal closure introduces 
further disruptions to movements of both labor and goods. Closure do has adverse 
impact on Palestinian economy through a drop in productivity, income, introducing a 
more strict policies and regulations of Banks and suppliers, and monopoly as a result of 
lack in resources. Segmentation of Gaza Strip means dividing the Gaza Strip into two or 
sometimes three parts, which limits or prevents totally the movement manpower, goods 
and services. Segmentation has a very bad impact in work activities due to shortage of 
workforce and construction materials. High costs of materials, lack of resources, 
limitations on importing, monopoly and banks policy are a result of closure and 
segmentation of the Gaza Strip. 
The results showed that the political sub-factors to be the most sever causes of contract's 
failure in Gaza Strip. This is justified because the study was conducted during the 
continued Intifada which followed 28, September 2000. 
 5.2.6 Overall ranks of all sub-factors 
  Table 5.2 Ranks of highest ten causes and related groups 
Sub-factor Main group Mean Rank 
Delay in collecting dibs from donors Political group 4.45  1 
Closure  Political group 4.37 2 
Depending on banks and paying high 
interest. 
Financial group 4.32 3 
Lack of capital Financial group 4.26 4 
Cash flow management  Financial group 4.26 4 
Lack of experience in the line of work Managerial group 4.25 5 
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Segmentation of Gaza Strip Political group 4.25 5 
Absence of construction regulations Environment group 4.22 6 
Low margin of profit due to competition Financial group 4.22 6 
Award contracts to lowest price Environment group 4.15 7 
Lack of experience in contracts Managerial group 4.15 7 
 
The results show that the ranks of the highest ten factors that cause failure are related 
mainly to political, financial and managerial groups as illustrated in Table 5.2. Using 
the analysis of variance ANOVA for each factor with the position of the person who 
filled the questionnaire, number of employees, number of projects executed during the 
last five years, years of experience, the volume of work of the company during the last 5 
years, company classification and company field of wok, there were no statistically 
significance differenced in the opinion of respondents contracting companies except 
classification of company with financial group. The Results showed that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the contractor's point of view of regarding the 
severity of causes except the company classification with financial group. Significant 
value is 0.032< 0.05. 
Multiple comparison test was conducted to determine which classes have significant 
difference. Benforni Analysis indicating that the significant difference is between the 
first and second class. It indicates that the answers of the second class are better than the 
first one because the mean difference between them is 0.3881. 
The argument of this result is that the contracting companies do not make use of years 
of experience. 
As a final comment, we accept the mull hypothesis which say that the means of all the 
levels are equal H0=0 which means that there are no significant difference between the 
mean of the levels.   
• Partial correlation coefficient test was conducted between groups. The value or r 
is between zero and one when r> 0-0.5 a weak positive relationship between 
  97
groups is found. When r> 0.5-1 a strong positive relationship is found. When r> 
-0.5-0.0 weak inverse relationship is found and when r> -0.5-(-1) a strong 
inverse relationship is found. Results from Partial Correlation coefficients for 
population characteristics (position, number of employees, number of executed 
projects, years of experience, volume of work, and company major and 
classification) showed that there is a strong positive relationship between: 
• Managerial and financial groups. 
• Financial and environment groups. 
• Financial and political groups. 
• Environment and political groups. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This chapter includes the conclusions of the study, practical recommendations  that 
may  prevent or even reduce construction business failure, and proposed additional 
studies in the subject. 
The main objective of this study is to determine the factors that cause failure to 
contractors in Gaza Strip. Then, determine the severity of each cause from the 
contractor's opinion. 
6.1 Conclusion 
50.8% of contracting companies have less than 8 years of experience. This may give 
an indication that the rate of failure in the coming years will be high since studies 
showed that 50-60% of failures was for companies of age less than 8 years. 
The majority of contracting companies in Gaza Strip are small in size that there will 
be one-man rule for the simple reason that, in most cases, the company may only 
have one manager at that early stage of existence and there will also be a lack of 
managerial depth. 
The construction industry has characteristics that sharply distinguish it from other 
sectors of the economy. It is fragmented, very sensitive to economic cycles, and 
highly competitive because of the large number of firms and relative ease of entry. It 
is basically due to these unique characteristics that the rate of construction business 
failure has become very high. 
In this study, understanding the mechanism of failure is based on collecting 
information about the causes of business failures and then corrective actions may be 
done to prevent or reverse the a company's collapse. Identification of the severity of 
causes of failure was a major result of this research. 
The focal point of this research is to explore the causes of contractor's failure in Gaza 
Strip. Contractors ranked:  
• Delay in collecting dibs from donors. 
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• Closure. 
• Depending on banks and paying high. 
• Lack of capital. 
• Lack of experience in the line of work. 
• Cash flow management.  
• Segmentation of Gaza Strip. 
• Low margin of profit due to competition. 
• Lack of experience in contracts. 
• Award contracts to lowest price. 
 As the highly influence factors that cause contractor's failure. 
  
• Managerial and Financial. 
• Financial and Expansion Environment and Political. 
• Expansion and Environment, Political. 
• Environment and Political. 
The results showed that there were no differences of opinion of contractors, at the 
5% significance level on almost all causes that lead to contractor's failure. The only 
exception was the company classification which only financial group. It was found 
that the significant deference was between class one and class two contractors. 
Furthermore, the 53 sub-factors considered in this study were listed under 5 main 
groups, which are ranked according to their severity of causing failure as follows: 
political group, financial group, managerial group, environment, and expansion 
groups. 
Five out of ten the highest causes are listed under the financial group, while 3 of 
them are listed under the political group. 
The Findings obtained from partial correlation test between groups that these is a 
strong positive relationship between: 
• Managerial and Financial groups 
• Financial and expansion and Environment political. 
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• Political and financial and expansion, environment. 
• Expansion with environment.  
The positive relation between groups means that when increasing the mean of one 
group the mean of the other will increase also.  
6.2 Recommendations 
The basis of this recommendations is 'curing is better than prevention'  
6.2.1 Recommendations to PNA 
1. The PNA must take the risk when the Donors delay the dibs of the contractors 
since most contracting companies in Gaza Strip are small in size with lack of capital. 
2. The PNA must modify and improve the regulations and laws to meet the impact of 
closure and segmentation of Gaza Strip. These regulations are supposed to make 
companies make profits. 
3. The PNA is recommended to connect the contract price with index. 
4. The PNA should introduce coherent polices towards groups of suffered people 
injured by failure. 
5. The PNA should conduct continuous training programs with co-operation with 
PCU and the Islamic University to improve managerial and financial practices to 
explain the internal and external factors affecting the construction industry.  
6- Tenders must be awarded to accurate estimated cost and not necessarily to the 
lowest bidder.  
6.2.2 Recommendations to the contractors 
1- The contractors are asked to avoid bank loans that make the company to think it 
has a good cash flow management.  
2- Top management must positively react to political and environmental change by 
means of managerial and financial policies. 
3- The contracting companies should not increase the number of projects that cannot 
be controlled. 
4- The contractors should avoid the increased volume of project (big project). 
5- Company top management must not be with same knowledge and experience. 
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6- Contracting company must calculate and consider political and environmental 
risks in costing and estimating contracts.  
6.3 Proposed further studies 
1- This study was conducted during the ongoing Aqsa Intifada. It is better to repeat 
this study in usual environment to compare to what extent the impact of Intifada has 
on contractors. 
2- It is necessary to repeat this research every 5 years to observe the new trends of 
contractors. 
3- Researches about the technology of failure prediction and administrative 
mechanism for applying this technology to contractors in Gaza Strip are needed. 
4- There is a need to model and modeling applications of the causes of failure that 
help in failure prediction like the Z model.  
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   ﻏـﺰة–اﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻹﺳـﻼﻣﻴﺔ 
   ﻗﺴﻢ اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳـﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ -آﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳــﺔ 
  
  
  
  اﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﺣﻮل 
  أﺳﺒﺎب ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻄﺎع ﻏﺰة
  
  وذﻟﻚ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺘﻜﻤﻴﻠﻲ ﻟﻨﻴﻞ درﺟﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ
  ﻓﻲ إدارة اﻟﻤﺸﺮوﻋﺎت اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﻴﺔ
  
  
  ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮؤوف اﻟﺤﻼق. م: اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ 
  اﻷﺳﺘﺎذ اﻟﺪآﺘﻮر ﻋﺪﻧﺎن اﻧﺸﺎﺻﻲ: اﻟﻤﺸﺮف 
  
 م2002 أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ –ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻦ اﻷول /  هـ 3241ﺷﻌﺒﺎن 
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   ﺣﻮل اﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ 
  أﺳﺒﺎب ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻄﺎع ﻏﺰة
  
  
  ________________________________________________________________/  اﻟﻤﻘﺎول يﻋﺰﻳﺰ
  
                                   اﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻴﻜﻢ ورﺣﻤﺔ اﷲ وﺑﺮآﺎﺗﻪ              
  
ﺗﻌﺘﺒﺮ هﺬﻩ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﺟﺰءًا ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺘﻜﻤﻴﻠﻲ ﻟﻨﻴﻞ درﺟﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﺟﺴﺘﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ إدارة 
اﻟﻤﺸﺮوﻋﺎت اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﻴﺔ ، ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻬﺪف هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻰ دراﺳﺔ وﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺆدي 
ة ، ﺁﻣﻠﻴﻦ أن ﻳﺘﻤﺨﺾ ﻋﻦ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻲ ﻓﺸﻞ واﻧﻬﻴﺎر ﺷﺮآﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻻت ﻓﻲ ﻗﻄﺎع ﻏﺰ
  .ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ ﻇﺎهﺮة اﻟﻔﺸﻞ واﻻﺑﺘﻌﺎد ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺒﺒﺎﺗﻪ
  :وﺗﺘﻜﻮن هﺬﻩ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ 
 .اﻟﺴﻴﺮة اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ .1
 :أﺳﺒﺎب ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ وﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﻟﻲ  .2
 .أﺳﺒﺎب إدارﻳﺔ ?
 .أﺳﺒﺎب ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ?
 .أﺳﺒﺎب ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻴﺔ ?
 .أﺳﺒﺎب ﺑﻴﺌﻴﺔ ?
  .أﺳﺒﺎب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ?
اردة ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ ﺳﻮف ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ، وﻟﻦ ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻷي إن اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻮ
  .أﻏﺮاض أﺧﺮي
  
  ﺷﺎآﺮﻳﻦ ﻟﻜﻢ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺗﻌﺎوﻧﻜﻢ ،،،
  
  
  
      اﻟﺒﺎﺣـﺚ                                                 
  ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﺮؤوف اﻟﺤﻼق . م 
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  اﻟﺴﻴﺮة اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ: اﻟﺠﺰء اﻷول 
  _______ _______________ﺳﻨﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﺳﻴﺲ  -1
 :اﻟﻤﺮآﺰ اﻹداري ﻟﻤﻦ ﻳﻘﻮم ﺑﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻹﺳﺘﺒﺎﻧﺔ  -2
  ﻧﺎﺋﺐ ﻣﺪﻳﺮ ?  ﻣﺪﻳﺮ                                 ?
  ﻣﻜﺘﺐ/ ﻣﻬﻨﺪس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ  ?  ﻣﺪﻳﺮ ﻣﺸﺮوع ?
  ____________________ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﻮﻇﻔﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ  -3
 ____________________       ادارﻳﻴﻦ ____________________ﻓﻨﻴﻴﻦ 
 :ﺔ  ﻋﺪد اﻟﻌﻤﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺮآ -4
   ﻋﺎﻣﻞ             001 إﻟﻰ أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ 05ﻣﻦ  ?   ﻋﺎﻣﻞ05أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ       ?
   ﻋﺎﻣﻞ               052أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ  ?   ﻋﺎﻣﻞ052 إﻟﻰ 001ﻣﻦ  ?
 :ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﻔﺬة ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﺨﻤﺲ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ  -5
   ﻣﺸﺮوع02 إﻟﻰ 11ﻣﻦ  ?   ﻣﺸﺎرﻳﻊ01أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ  ?
   ﻣﺸﺮوع04 إﻟﻰ 13ﻣﻦ  ?   ﻣﺸﺮوع         03 إﻟﻰ 12ﻣﻦ  ?
     ﻣﺸﺮوع04ﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ أآ ?
 :ﻋﺪد ﺳﻨﻮات اﻟﺨﺒﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻻت  -6
  ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﺔ إﻟﻲ ﺛﻼث ﺳﻨﻮات ?  أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﺔ ?
  أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻤﺲ ﺳﻨﻮات إﻟﻰ ﻋﺸﺮ ﺳﻨﻮات ?  أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻼث ﺳﻨﻮات إﻟﻲ ﺧﻤﺲ ﺳﻨﻮات      ?
    أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺸﺮ ﺳﻨﻮات ?
 :ﺣﺠﻢ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺪوﻻر ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﺨﻤﺲ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ   -7
   ﻣﻠﻴﻮن دوﻻر01 إﻟﻰ 5ﻣﻦ  ?   ﻣﻠﻴﻮن دوﻻر        01ﻣﻦ أآﺜﺮ  ?
  إﻟﻰ أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن دوﻻر 000,005 ﻣﻦ ?   ﻣﻠﻴﻮن دوﻻر     5 إﻟﻰ أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ 1ﻣﻦ  ?
     دوﻻر000,005أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ  ?
  : ﺗﺼﻨﻴﻒ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﺣﺴﺐ ﺗﺼﻨﻴﻒ ﻟﺠﻨﺔ اﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻒ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ  -8
 اﻟﺘﺨﺼﺺ
  ﺻﻴﺎﻧﺔ  آﻬﺮوﻣﻴﻜﺎﻧﻴﻚ  ﻣﻴﺎﻩ وﻣﺠﺎري  ﻃﺮق  أﺑﻨﻴﺔ  اﻟﺪرﺟﺔ
            "أ " درﺟﺔ أوﻟﻲ 
            "ب"وﻟﻲ درﺟﺔ أ
            ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺔ
            ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺔ
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  أﺳﺒﺎب ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ: اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ 
  :ﻳﺮﺟﻰ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ درﺟﺔ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻟﻴﻦ وﻓﻘًﺎ ﻟﻠﺮﻣﻮز اﻟﻤﺪوﻧﺔ أدﻧﺎﻩ 
  درﺟﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﺮﻣﺰ
  ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺪرﺟﺔ ﻗﻠﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺪًا  1
  ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺪرﺟﺔ ﻗﻠﻴﻠﺔ  2
  ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺪرﺟﺔ ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻄﺔ  3
  ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺪرﺟﺔ آﺒﻴﺮة  4
  ﻣﺆﺛﺮ ﺑﺪرﺟﺔ آﺒﻴﺮة ﺟﺪًا  5
  
  5  4  3  2  1   أﺳﺒﺎب إدارﻳﺔ.i
            اﻟﺨﺒﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻟﻌﻤﻞ  1
            اﺳﺘﺒﺪال اﻹدارﻳﻴﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺟﺤﻴﻦ  2
            ﺗﻌﻴﻴﻦ ﻣﻬﻨﺪس ﻣﻮﻗﻊ  3
            اﻟﻘﺮارات اﻟﺨﺎﻃﺌﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ  4
            إﻧﺘﺎﺟﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﺎل وﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮهﺎ  5
            اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﻘﻨﻴﺔ إدارة اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ  6
            هﻴﻜﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ وﺗﻨﻈﻴﻤﻬﺎ  7
            إدارة ﺗﻮرﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﻮاد  8
            اﻟﺸﻜﺎوى ﺿﺪ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ  9
            ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ  01
            ﻏﻴﺎب ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ  11
            اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﺎت اﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ  21
            اﻟﺴﺮﻗﺎت  31
            اﻹهﻤﺎل  41
            اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻧﻈﺎم ﺗﻮﺛﻴﻖ  51
            ﺨﺒﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻓﻬﻢ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد وﺷﺮوﻃﻬﺎ  اﻟ  61
            (ﻣﺮآﺰﻳﺔ اﻹدارة)اﻹدارة اﻟﻔﺮدﻳﺔ   71
            اﻟﺘﻀﺨﻢ اﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﻲ ﻟﺪي اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ  81
            ﻧﻈﺎم اﻻﺗﺼﺎﻻت  91
            ﻗﺪرة اﻟﺘﻜﻴﻒ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ  02
            (ﺣﺎﻓﺰ ﻟﻄﺎﻗﻢ اﻹدارة،  ﻣﺴﺘﻮي اﻟﺤﻤﺎس، اﻹﺛﺎرة، ال) اﻻﻟﺘﺰام   12
            .......... (ﻣﺤﺎﺳﺒﻴﻦ، ﻣﺤﺎﻣﻴﻦ ، ﺑﻨﻜﻴﻴﻦ ، ) رات اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﻴﻦ ﻋﺪم اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻲ اﺳﺘﺸﺎ  22
            ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﺔ و اﻟﺘﺤﻜﻢ  32
111 
   
  5  4  3  2  1  أﺳﺒﺎب ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ.ii
            ﺗﺪﻧﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﺢ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ   1
            إدارة اﻟﺴﻴﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺪﻳﺔ   2
              ﺗﻘﻨﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﺮ اﻟﻌﻄﺎءات   3
              اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻷواﻣﺮ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮﻳﺔ  4
            اﺳﺘﺮداد اﻟﻤﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﺑﺴﺮﻋﺔ وﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ   5  
            اﻟﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻗﻴﻤﺔ واﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻤﻌﺪات   6  
            ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ رﺑﺢ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻨﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ    7
              ﺣﻘﻮق وﺗﻌﻮﻳﻀﺎت اﻟﻤﻮﻇﻔﻴﻦ  8
            ﻓﺎﻗﺪ اﻟﻤﻮاد  9
            رأس اﻟﻤﺎل ﻏﻴﺮ آﺎﻓﻲ  01
            زﻳﺎدة اﻟﻤﺼﺎرﻳﻒ اﻹدارﻳﺔ  11
  21
ﻟﻌﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺗﻐﻴﺮ ﺳﻌﺮ ﺻﺮف ا
  ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻼت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺪﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد
          
            اﻻﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك ودﻓﻊ ﻓﻮاﺋﺪ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﺔ  31
  
  5  4  3  2  1  أﺳﺒﺎب ﺗﻮﺳﻌﻴﺔ.iii
            ﻓﺘﺢ ﻓﺮوع ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻟﻠﺸﺮآﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﺎت أﺧﺮى  1
            زﻳﺎدة ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ ﻟﺪى اﻟﻤﻘﺎول   2
            زﻳﺎدة ﺣﺠﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻳﻊ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﺪل   3
            ﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﺠﺎل ﺗﺨﺼﺺ اﻟﻤﻘﺎول ﺗ  4
  5
ﺿﻌﻒ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻮاﻓﻖ ﺗﻄﻮر اﻟﺸﺮآﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ 
  اﻹداري 
          
            ﺗﻐﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻤﻞ ﺣﻜﻮﻣﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺧﺎص  أو اﻟﻌﻜﺲ  6
 
  5  4  3  2  1  أﺳﺒﺎب ﺑﻴﺌﻴﺔ.vi
            هﺒﻮط ﻓﻲ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻼد   1
            ﻏﻴﺎب اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ واﻟﻨﻈﻢ ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻻت  2
            ﻠﻰ أﻗﻞ اﻷﺳﻌﺎرﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺘﺮﺳﻴﺔ ﻋ  3
            أﻃﺮاف اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻗﺪﻋﺪم وﺟﻮد ﻣﺤﺎآﻢ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﻟﻔﺾ اﻟﻨﺰاﻋﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ   4
            ﺗﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬ  5
            ﺳﻮء اﻟﻄﻘﺲ   6
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  7
اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ، ﻧﻈﺎم )اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻼد 
  (اﻟﺦ...اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ، اﻟﻔﺎﺗﻮرة اﻟﺼﻔﺮﻳﺔ 
          
            ﻓﻲاﻟﻔﻮز ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻄﺎءات ﻏﻴﺮ آﺎ  8
 
.v
  أﺳﺒﺎب ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ
اﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻵﺗﻴﺔ ﻧﺎﺗﺠﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ )
  (وﻣﺘﺄﺛﺮة ﺑﻪ
  5  4  3  2  1
            اﻹﻏﻼق ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع    1
            ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع إﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ  2
            ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك   3
            اﺣﺘﻜﺎر اﻟﺴﻮق   4
            ﻏﻼء اﻟﻤﻮاد   5
            ﻧﻘﺺ اﻟﻤﻮارد  6
            اﻟﺘﺠﺎراﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻼت ﻣﻊ اﻟﻤﻮردﻳﻦ و  7
            اﻟﻘﻴﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺘﻴﺮاد اﻟﻤﻮاد  8
  9
( اﻟﻤﻮارد) ﺗﺄﺧﻴﺮ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺤﻘﺎت 
  اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﻮﻟﻴﻦ
          
  
  
  
  ﺷﺎآﺮﻳﻦ ﺣﺴﻦ ﺗﻌﺎوﻧﻜﻢ ،،،
  
  
   
  ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﻋﺒﺪاﻟﺮؤوف اﻟﺤﻼق. م/ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ 
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Annex 2 
Part 1: Organization Profile  
1. year of establishment: 
2. poison: 
□ Director  □ Vice director  
□ Project manager □ Site/office engineer 
 
3.  Number of employees ___________ 
4. Number of labors  
□ Less than 50 □ From 50 to less than 100  
□ From 100 to 250 □ More than 250 
5. Number of  project 
□ Less than 10 □ From 11 t o 20  
□ From 21 to 30 □ From 31 to 40 
□ More than  40  
6. Years of experience in the line of work  
□ Less than 1 year □ From 1 to 3 years  
□ More than 3 to 5 years □ More than 5 to 10 years 
□ Over 10 years  
 
7. Volume during the last 5 years  
□ More than $10 million  □ From  $5 to $10 million 
□ From  $1 to less than $5 million □ From  $0.5 to less than $1 million 
□ Less than $0.5 million  
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Part 2: Causes of Contractor Failure 
 
Symbol Meaning 
1 Very low influence 
2 low influence 
3 moderate influence 
4 high influence 
5 Very high influence 
 
I. Managerial group 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Lack of experience in the line of work      
2 Replace key personnel      
3 Assigning site engineer      
4 Bad decisions in regulating company policy      
5 Labor productivity and improvement      
6 Use of project management techniques      
7 Company organization      
8 Procurement practices      
9 Claims       
10 Internal company problems       
11 Owner absence from the company      
12 Using computers applications      
13 Frauds      
14 Neglect      
15 Using of documentation system      
16 Lack of experience in contracts      
17 One man rule       
18 Inflation      
19 Communication system      
20 React to change      
21 Commitment      
22 Competent consultation       
23 Control system      
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II. Financial group 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Low margin of profit due to competition      
2 Cash flow management       
3 Estimating practices       
4 Dealing with variation order       
5 Bill and collecting effectively       
6 Controlling equipment cost and usage       
7 Evaluation of profit yearly       
8 Employee benefits and compensation      
9 Material wastages       
10 Lack of capital       
11 Mistiming of capital expenditures      
12 Difference of local currency exchange with contract 
currency  
     
13 Depending on banks and paying high interests      
 
 
 
III. Expansion group 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Opening a regional office in other governorates       
2 Increase number of projects      
3 Increase size of projects      
4 Change in the type of work      
5 Lack of managerial development as the company 
grow 
     
6 Change work from private to public or vice versa       
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IV. Environment group 1 2 3 4 5 
1 National slump in economy      
2 Absence of construction regulations      
3 Award contracts to lowest price      
4 Absence of specialized courts       
5 Owner involvement in construction phase      
6 Bad weather       
7 Accounting and tax practices      
8 Insufficient award of contracts        
 
 
V. Political group 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Closure      
2 Segmentation of Gaza Strip      
3 Banks policy      
4 Monopoly      
5 High cost of materials      
6 Lack of resources      
7 Dealing with suppliers and traders      
8 Limitation on importing      
9 Delay in collecting dibs from clients      
 
 
 
